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ABSTRACT 
Internet censorship and surveillance is on the rise globally and cyber-
warfare increasing in scope and intensity.  To help understand these new 
threats, commentators have grasped at historical analogies often with 
little regard for historical complexities or international perspective. 
Unfortunately, helpful new works on telecommunications history have 
focused primarily on U.S. history with little focus on international 
developments.  There is thus a need for further internationally oriented 
investigation of telecommunications technologies, and their history.  This 
essay attempts to help fill that void, drawing on case studies wherein 
global telecommunications technologies have been disrupted or censored – 
telegram censorship and surveillance, high frequency radio jamming, and 
direct broadcast satellite blocking.  The case studies suggest remarkable 
regulatory patterns or cycles with insights for current censorship and 
privacy threats and challenges. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Internet censorship and surveillance is on the rise globally with 
state cyber-policing capabilities rapidly evolving and cyber 
warfare becoming a concern for major infrastructure and 
industries.1  To help understand these new threats – and their 
implications for global telecommunications and relations – 
commentators have grasped at historical analogies, with Cold War 
parallels commonly raised, often with little context or regard for 
                                                     
1  For a discussion of not only increasing international state censorship – 
including political and non-political filtering – but also broader notions of power 
and cyberwarfare, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Cyber Power, in JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE 
FUTURE OF POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2011), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf.  For a discussion of 
how technology increases the scope and reach of state surveillance, and the 
implications of that reality, see JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 
AND HOW TO STOP IT 109–23 (2008).  In terms of reports of increasing surveillance, 
see Zach Miners, Latest Transparency Reports Show Steady Rise in Surveillance Data 
Requests, IDG NEWS SERV. (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:31 PM), 
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=C06C2F1A-E70F-545F-696A17DD7891B679; 
Special Report on Internet Surveillance, Focusing on 5 Governments and 5 Companies 
“Enemies of the Internet,” REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, available at 
http://en.rsf.org/special-report-on-internet-11-03-2013,44197.html 
(“[G]overnments are increasingly using technology that monitors online activity 
. . .”); ONI Team, Global Internet Filtering in 2012 at a Glance, OPEN NET INITIATIVE 
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://opennet.net/blog/2012/04/global-internet-filtering-2012-
glance (noting that at least a third of Internet users live in countries with 
substantive Internet blocking or censorship); James Ball,  Angry Birds and ‘Leaky’ 
Phone Apps Targeted by NSA and GCHQ for User Data, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2014, 
2:51 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-
smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data; David E. & Thom Shanker,  NSA 
Devises Radio Pathway into Computers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-
connected-to-internet.html; Steven Rich & Barton Gellman,  NSA Seeks to Build 
Quantum Computer that Could Crack Most Types of Encryption, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-
build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-
encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2story.html; Nicole 
Perlroth et al., NSA Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-
encryption.html?_r=0.  Finally, on the costs and risks of cyberwar for 
infrastructure and industry, see Julie Hull, Himanshu Khurana, Tom Markham & 
Kevin Staggs, Staying in Control: Cybersecurity and the Modern Electric Grid, 10 
IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAG. 41, 41–48 (2012); see also Kenneth Geers, Cyberspace 
and the Changing Nature of Warfare, SC MAG., Aug. 27, 2008, 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/cyberspace-and-the-changing-nature-of-
warfare/article/115929/. 
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consistency or historical complexities.2 
Helpfully, there have been some more comprehensive works 
on telecommunications history produced in recent years,3 but these 
have primarily explored U.S. history and industry, with less focus 
on international developments or case studies. For example, 
Richard R. John’s Network Nation: Inventing American 
Telecommunications4 provides an excellent account of both the 
                                                     
2  Sean Lawson, Putting the “War” in Cyberwar: Metaphor, Analogy, and 
Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States, 17 FIRST MONDAY 1, 2 (2012), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270 (“[P]olicy–
makers and military leaders have looked primarily to war–related historical 
analogies and metaphors to aid their understanding of and responses to cyber 
security challenges”).  This includes Western media too – see, for example, Sanger 
& Shanker (2014), supra note 1 (comparing Chinese malware tracking to Soviets 
tracking submarines in the Cold War); Noah Schachtman & Peter W. Singer, The 
Wrong War: The Insistence on Applying Cold War Metaphors to Cybersecurity Is 
Misplaced and Counterproductive, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/08/15-cybersecurity-singer-
shachtman. 
3  See e.g., Dwayne Winseck, Review Essay: Network Nation: Inventing American 
Telecommunications, 53 BUS. HIST. 641–47 (2011) (providing a review of RICHARD R. 
JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2010)); TIM 
WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) 
(illustrating the history of cable, from the evolution of cable as a “dive bar[,] . . . 
attract[ing] shady characters” in the 1960s to the fight between broadcasting and 
cable, to “corporate reincarnation” and conglomeration of the film industry, 
broadcast networks, and cable companies in the 1980s and 1990s).  Id. at 178–79, 
205.  There is additional scholarship that is less comprehensive – for example, 
focusing on a single technology or industry sector – but nevertheless, they 
provide insightful explorations.  See, e.g., ROBERT MACDOUGALL, THE PEOPLE’S 
NETWORK: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TELEPHONE IN THE GILDED AGE (2014); 
DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA, 1832–1920, 181 (2012) (providing 
a chronology of the telegraph in America); COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE SEAS: THE 
EVOLVING CABLE NETWORK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Bernard Finn & Daqing Yang, 
eds., 2009) (focusing mainly on cable network evolution); Sumit K. Majumdar, 
Ulku Yaylacicegi & Rabih Moussawi, Mergers and Synergy: Lessons from 
Contemporary Telecommunications History, 36 TELECOMM. POL’Y 140, 154 (2012).  For 
a focus on an Asian perspective, see DAQING YANG, TECHNOLOGY OF EMPIRE: 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND JAPANESE EXPANSION IN ASIA, 1883–1945 (2010).  
Beyond mere telecommunications history, scholars like Yochai Benkler, Susan 
Crawford, and Brett Frischmann have offered important insights into factors 
driving regulatory and technological developments in telecommunications, such 
as licensing practices, infrastructure, or industry monopolies.  See, e.g., Yochai 
Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, 26 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 90–93 (2012); SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE 
TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013); BRETT 
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012). 
4  Dwayne Winseck, Review Essay: Network Nation: Inventing American 
Telecommunications, 53 BUS. HIST. 641–47 (2011) (providing a review of RICHARD R. 
JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2010)). 
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telegraph and telephone’s rise and evolution with American 
telecommunications, yet the work fails to fully consider how these 
developments relate to similar global changes at the time.5  Tim 
Wu also offers an insightful account of information industries in 
The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.6  
However, Wu’s eyes are trained toward current U.S. debates about 
network neutrality and telecommunications regulation, and thus 
focuses primarily on American history, leaving important 
questions open concerning the impact and role of international 
telecommunications history and regulatory trends.7 
Given the international character of telecommunications 
technologies like the Internet, and the tendency for commentators 
to draw historical parallels, there is a need for further investigation 
of telecommunications technologies and their history, with an eye 
to international developments.  Indeed, Ross Anderson, a leading 
technology researcher, has recently called for a more systematic 
and interdisciplinary approach to these issues, arguing, for 
example, that the dynamics of information industries has 
implications for how we understand and regulate international 
relations and conflict.8  This essay attempts to offer some pieces to 
that puzzle, with an examination of case studies wherein global 
telecommunications technologies have been disrupted or censored 
– telegram censorship, surveillance, and cable cutting, high 
frequency radio jamming, and direct broadcast satellite blocking – 
and how the world community responded to that disruption 
through international law and politics.  Drawing on that history, 
this essay aims to show first that case studies do suggest certain 
patterns or cycles of global telecommunications censorship and 
surveillance comparable to Wu’s framework; but that these 
challenges are neither inevitable nor insurmountable.  Rather, these 
                                                     
5  Id. 
6  WU, supra note 3. 
7  See Jonathan D. Aronson, Book Review: The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of 
Information Empires, 5 INT’L J. COMMC’NS 89, 93 (2011) (reviewing TIM WU, THE 
MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010)). 
8  Ross Anderson, Privacy Versus Government Surveillance: Where Network 
Effects Meet Public Choice 1, Proc. 13th Annual Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS 2014), available at 
http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson-WEIS2014.pdf (“The forces 
that lead to pervasive monopolies in the information industries – network effects, 
technical lock-in and low marginal costs – are pervasive in the affairs of states too, 
once we look for them; they are just not yet 
recognised as such.”). 
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patterns may be “broken” or mitigated by more cooperative 
international regulatory approaches.  Along the way, the paper 
also draws on the case studies to offer guidance as to future trends 
in Internet regulation, censorship, and surveillance and lessons to 
tackle such challenges. 
Beyond these bigger questions, the work’s focus on 
international policy-making means it should also provide some 
insights on typical questions raised about Internet censorship and 
surveillance, and its resistance, under international law.  For 
example, a few previous studies have examined or noted the legal 
implications of Internet filtering,9 mapping,10 or censorship 
circumvention,11 yet none have examined, in depth, how 
circumvention of state-implemented Internet censorship or 
surveillance fits within international law and its politics.  This is 
perhaps because the use, distribution, or development of Internet 
censorship and surveillance resistant systems or censorship 
circumvention tools – what will be referred to here as censorship or 
surveillance resistance activities – are often seen as the work of 
private citizens, organizations, and other non-state actors, and not 
subjects of the international system.  Still, the legitimacy of such 
activities has been questioned as either Western interference with 
other states’ sovereign values or as a threat to national security.12  
Situating such activities within broader international legal rules or 
norms can provide meaningful “moral, rhetorical, and at least 
                                                     
9  OpenNet Initiative, A Starting Point: Legal Implications of Internet Filtering 1, 
4, OPEN NET INITIATIVE (2004), http://opennet.net/docs/Legal_Implications.pdf. 
10  Joss Wright, Tulio de Souza & Ian Brown, Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping: 
Information Sources, Legality and Ethics 1, 1–3, 1st USENIX Workshop on Free and 
Open Commc’ns on the Internet (2011), available at 
http://static.usenix.org/events/foci11/tech/final_files/Wright.pdf. 
11  Derek Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J., 377, 441–43 (2009). 
12  See e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Freedom.gov, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/freedomgov?page=full 
(noting that Internet freedom is viewed in some quarters as “another Trojan horse 
for American imperialism”); Andrew Lloyd, Increasing Global Demand for an 
Uncensored Internet – How the U.S. Can Help Defeat Online Censorship by Facilitating 
Private Action, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 299, 300–01 (2008) (arguing that U.S. 
funding “anti-jamming” technologies to defeat censorship perceived as “imposing 
its own standards of decency and morals onto China and other countries . . .”); 
Philip J. Oliveri, Technology Software that Counters Internet Jamming: Its Role in the 
U.S. and in Non-Democratic Countries, SYRACUSE L. & TECH J. 5, 9 (2003) (suggesting 
that promoting anti-jamming and anti-circumvention tools infringes on state 
sovereignty); Jennifer Shyu, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 239–42 (2008–2009) (speaking of censorship circumvention 
and anonymizing tools as a threat to national security). 
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arguable legal support” to justify censorship or surveillance 
resistance and its various components like filter circumvention or 
anonymous access.13 
International law, it is often assumed, has little to say about 
Internet censorship, and even less to offer in constraining or 
resisting it, because the practice involves two irreconcilable 
principles of international law – rights to information and 
expression and states’ sovereign right to police their territories.14  
Yet this is likely an overly simplified account.  Thus, examining 
case studies involving global communication disruption, and their 
legal and political dimensions, could offer insights into both 
regulatory patterns and lessons for similar challenges today.15 
 
2. FRAMING THE INQUIRY 
 
Wu’s Master Switch introduces us to what he calls “the Cycle” 
within U.S. telecommunications industry, that is, the tendency for 
information empires to begin with a period of openness and 
novelty, but eventually progress toward monopoly, centralization, 
and a closed approach to telecommunications.16  This essay 
certainly draws on Wu’s research for guidance in outlining 
comparable developments, but unlike Master Switch, the patterns 
or cycles identified are internationally oriented, tracking a seeming 
pattern by which global telecommunications technologies are 
adopted, facilitated, controlled, and then censored or monitored at 
                                                     
13  See Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well 35 (Miami Law Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 2011-29, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930017. 
14  Rochelle B. Price, Jamming and the Law of International Communications, 5 
MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD., 391, 391–92 (1984); Katherine Tsai, How to Create 
International Law: The Case of Internet Freedom in China, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
401, 402–03 n.402 (2011) (questioning whether international law has an answer to 
China’s sovereign claim to censor Internet content). 
15  See generally Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Reluctant Gatekeepers: 
Corporate Ethics on a Filtered Internet, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY 
OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 103–22 (Ronald Diebert et al. eds., 2008), available at 
http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accessdenied-chapter-
5.pdf (discussing the complexities involved in these issues); Eszter Hargittai, 
Radio’s Lessons for the Internet, 43 COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 51, 52 (2000) (asserting 
that a “historical look” can provide a clearer understanding of factors shaping the 
“media landscape”). 
16  WU, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
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an international level (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 
An Adaption of Wu’s “Cycle” 
in the Global Telecommunications Context? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, case studies focusing on three global telecommunications 
technology – telegraph, radio, satellite – were selected largely on 
the basis of the high level of international regulatory attention 
these technologies attracted.  The International Telegraph Union 
(today the International Telecommunication Union), the world’s 
central regulatory agency for international telecommunications, 
was founded to regulate telegraph communications and, in the 
20th Century, its name change reflected a broader mandate to 
cover other technologies.17  The ITU also organized large-scale 
regulatory efforts on radio and satellite in the Post-War period.18 
                                                     
17 Overview of ITU’s History, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, available at 
http://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/ITUsHistory.aspx (noting major 
initiatives on the telegraph, and, after the Second World War, both on radio as 
well as satellite).  Additionally, a predominant number of the hundred odd ITU 
telecommunication conferences and assemblies held since its founding, have 
focused on the telegraph (24), radio (62), and space/satellite (6).  In contrast, the 
ITU has held few on television (2) and has held none on “global” communication 
technologies like the GPS and telex.  See List of ITU Conferences, Assemblies and 
Events, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, available at 
http://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/ListOfITUConferencesAssembliesAndEv
ents.aspx (delineating the conferences, assemblies, and events and showing that 
there have been only two conferences focused on the television in 1986 and 1989). 
18  Hargittai, supra note 15. 
CONFLICT /  
CONTROL 
CONSENSUS 
CENSORSHIP /  
SURVEILLANCE 
INNOVATION / 
INTERVENTION 
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As will be seen, the case studies suggest that global 
telecommunications technologies also appear to follow comparable 
patterns to Wu’s “Cycle.”  The technologies are first adopted or 
promoted in an initial stage, where the international community, 
and most states, develops a consensus about the technology’s 
advantages and positive potential.  This consensus typically 
becomes reflected in law and policy at the time.  However, as states 
begin to fully understand the technology – both as a potential tool 
to promote national interests abroad, and as a threat to the state’s 
agenda or security – that consensus breaks down.  This leads to a 
sustained period of conflict, often taking the form of information 
conflicts or information wars, and a bid by governments to attempt 
to control the technology, both domestically and through 
international efforts.  Such “control” typically manifests itself in 
both censorship and surveillance of the technology in question.  
What appears to disrupt (or reset) the “pattern” is typically 
technological innovation or regulatory intervention.  For example, 
a new communications technology eclipses the old, or there is 
some kind of regulatory intervention by international entities that 
pushes things in a different direction. 
These regulatory patterns and the above-noted framework 
should be kept in mind as the case studies are explored. 
Importantly, however, unlike Wu, whose capitalization of his 
“Cycle” suggests the process he analyzes is inevitable, the patterns 
explored in these case studies are not treated as either essential or 
inevitable, nor should they be. There are certainly other 
technologies (like global positioning systems (GPS)) that are 
arguably “global” and relating to communications that do not 
follow these patterns of international conflict, regulation, 
surveillance, and control.  Moreover, drawing on various aspects of 
the case studies, this paper also argues that the very patterns 
observed may be mitigated, even “broken,” by more cooperative 
international regulatory efforts.  These case studies will also 
hopefully offer insights for comparable contemporary 
technologies, namely, the Internet. 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 703 
3. GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONTROL:  THREE CASE STUDIES 
3.1. Case Study One:                                                                          
Telegraph Cable Cutting, Censorship, and Surveillance 
 
Internet censorship is often compared to Cold War radio 
jamming,19 but the telegraph offers our first case study.  In fact, one 
of the earliest instances where transnational communications were 
disrupted by states involved the telegraph – submarine cable 
cutting and cable message surveillance and suppression in the late 
19th and early 20th century. The first transatlantic submarine 
cables, through which telegraph cables could be communicated, 
were laid by the 1850s, only a few years after the introduction of 
telegraph.20  Through efforts led mainly by Britain, an extensive 
web of submarine cables were subsequently laid between countries 
in Europe, Africa, and Asia, and by the 20th century most of the 
world was linked, establishing one of the earliest global 
telecommunications networks.21 British companies, with the 
assistance of the Empire, owned and controlled the vast majority of 
this submarine cable network.22  The submarine telegraph cable 
network proved a powerful tool.  Its global reach for commerce, 
diplomacy, and the free flow of information it promoted, allowed 
rapid, safer, and more secure communications between 
governments, dissemination of information between populations, 
and more efficient coordination for world shipping and trade.23 
Much like Internet censorship today, the submarine cable 
                                                     
19  See, e.g., Hargittai, supra note 15, at 51 (comparing the origins and 
subsequent regulation of radio communication with Internet censorship). 
20  See generally DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE INVISIBLE WEAPON: 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 1851–1945, 28–49 (1991) 
(providing a historical review of the development of telegraph cables, including 
the first transatlantic submarine cables and the expansion of the global cable 
network between 1866–1895). 
21  Id.; see also A. Pearce Higgins, Submarine Cables and International Law, 2 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 27–30 (1922) (emphasizing the international importance of 
the cables and noting that the Treaty of Versailles lists the cables, “as follows: 
Emden-New York, Teneriffe Monrovia, . . . Constantinople-Constanza”).  Id. at 27.  
22  Higgins, supra note 21, at 28 (“The British  public  had  early grasped  the  
importance  of  the cable  as  a means  of  linking  up  the  world-wide  Empire 
. . .”); UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM (UNEP), SUBMARINE CABLES AND THE 
OCEANS: CONNECTING THE WORLD 13 (2009) [hereinafter UNEP], available at 
http://www.iscpc.org/publications/ICPC-UNEP_Report.pdf . 
 23 UNEP, supra note 22, at 13, 26. 
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network’s importance to global communications also made it a 
target for disruption by hostile states that, strategically, could 
isolate or weaken enemies by disrupting state and commercial 
communications.  And while submarine cables were much more 
secure than land cables, they could be damaged, and with the right 
equipment, cut.24  Early on, the telegraph cable network was 
mostly seen as beneficial to trade, commerce, and diplomacy.25 
Thus, the telegraph’s international cable network was mostly 
developed through private investment – companies seeking to 
benefit commercially from this new communications technology.26 
Yet, with the use of telegraph cables by the British Army during 
the Crimean War and, most importantly, a cable link to India – a 
key regional asset in the Empire – the British Government did not 
take long to realize the strategic importance of the telegraph 
network and its vulnerability to cable-cutting and other 
disruptions by hostile States.27  The telegraph cable network was 
also vulnerable to censorship and surveillance.  Most of the global 
network was controlled by public and private companies from a 
handful of States – with Britain being the most dominant, though 
Germany had also invested heavily.28  If either State decided to 
block or suppress telegraph communications, they would be well 
positioned to do so.29 
 
 
                                                     
24  P.M. Kennedy, Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914, 86 
ENGLISH HIST. REV. 728 (1921). 
25  Id. at 729. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. at 732. 
28  Higgins, supra note 21, at 27–30. 
29  Britain would quickly take advantage of its strategic position at the eve of 
World War I.  See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 751–52 (“On the other hand, the 
Admiralty showed extraordinary speed in cutting the German cables: on the 
morning after the British ultimatum to Berlin had expired, for example, the two 
ends of the German Atlantic cable had been cut and were later taken into the 
harbours of Falmouth and Halifax.  Other lines were similarly dealt with, and the 
German cables, like their colonies, were divided amongst the victorious allies in 
the Versailles settlement.  Moreover, the political advantages which Britain (and 
to a lesser extent, France) gained from the virtual control of war news to the 
United States and to the rest of the neutral world confirmed the value of this 
system of communication.”) (footnotes omitted).  
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3.1.1. Consensus:  Facilitating and Protecting Telegraph 
Communications and the Telegraph Cable Network 
 
Not surprising given its obvious importance to global 
communications and commerce at this time, Britain worked to 
build international consensus about the need to promote the 
telegraph telecommunications network.  This was not difficult, at 
least at this time.  As noted by historian P.M. Kennedy, to the “mid 
Victorian mind,” the telegraph and its cable communications 
network was mostly viewed as one of a “long series of 
technological innovations” that would mainly contribute to “trade 
and prosperity,” with “businessmen, journalists, and diplomats” as 
the chief beneficiaries.30  Moreover, a “cable boom” that began in 
the 1860s and peaked in the 1870s – spurred on largely through 
private commercial efforts – meant that by this time much of 
Europe, and parts of both the Middle East and Asia, were 
connected by land and submarine telegraph cables making the 
telegraph communications valuable to a number of powers like 
Russia, France, Germany, and the United States.31 
The goodwill felt internationally toward the telegraph cable 
network – despite being largely owned by British private interests 
– is reflected in correspondence between U.S. President James 
Buchanan and Queen Victoria in 1858, on the occasion of the first 
transatlantic cable being sent.32  The Queen had written to the 
President about the submarine cable, proclaiming it would provide 
an “additional link between the nations, whose friendship is 
founded upon their common interest and reciprocal esteem[;]”33 to 
which the President replied: 
 
May the Atlantic telegraph, under the blessing of heaven, 
prove to be a bond of perpetual peace and friendship 
between the kindred nations, and an instrument destined 
by Divine Providence to diffuse religion, liberty, and law 
                                                     
30  Kennedy, supra note 24, at 729. 
31  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 93; Kennedy, supra note 24, at 732–37. 
32  Kennedy, supra note 24, at 729. 
33  LORDS OF THE COMM. OF PRIVY COUNCIL FOR TRADE & THE ATLANTIC TEL. CO., 
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBMARINE 
TELEGRAPH CABLES; TOGETHER WITH THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE AND APPENDIX 232 
(1861).  
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throughout the world.  In this view will not all the nations 
of Christendom spontaneously unite in the declaration that 
it shall be forever neutral, and that its communication shall 
be held sacred in passing to the place of their destination, 
even in the midst of hostilities?34 
 
Similar sentiments can also be seen years later in W.H. 
Russell’s The Atlantic Telegraph, his official account of the 1865 
expedition to lay the “Great Eastern” cable across the Atlantic 
Ocean.  Russell wrote of the Cable of 1865 as an “enduring link, 
which, under God’s blessing, may confer unnumbered blessings on 
the nations which the ocean has so long divided” and the “greatest 
work of civilized man, and the grandest exposition of the 
development of the faculties bestowed on him to overcome 
material difficulties. . . .”35 
An expression of the times, it is not surprising similarly 
positive sentiments would be reflected in the more significant 
international legal measures enacted during this time concerning 
global telegraph communications:  the International Telegraph 
Convention (first enacted in 1865, but substantially altered in 1872 
and 1875) and the 1884 International Convention for the Protection 
of Submarine Cables.36  The global consensus and positive attitude 
about the telegraph particularly permeated the 1875 international 
telegraph conference in St. Petersburg that led to the 1875 
Convention, where “friendly relations” and diplomacy among 
world powers were pervasive.37  The 1875 Telegraph Convention 
                                                     
34 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 730 (citation omitted) (quoting President 
Buchanan in his response to Queen Victoria’s greetings).  See also W.H. RUSSELL, 
THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH (1865) (chronicling the engineering process as well as 
the cultural significance of laying the transatlantic cable, thereby connecting 
Europe with the New World). 
35 RUSSELL, supra note 34, at 103–04.  
36  The 1875 International Telegraph Convention is often referred to as the 
“St. Petersburg Convention,” after the location of the conference.  The Submarine 
Convention was signed in 1884 but did not come into effect until 1888.  See Ted 
Magder, The Origins of International Agreements and Global Media: The Post, the 
Telegraph, and Wireless Communication Before World War I, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
GLOBAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION POLICY 23, 30–33 (Robin Mansell & Marc 
Raboy eds., 2011) (describing the evolving political context in which the  St. 
Petersburg Convention was negotiated). 
37  J. Henry Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International 
Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space, 60 MICH. L. REV. 269, 269–70 
(1962). 
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would turn out to be the most significant international legal 
instrument concerning communications in this era.38 
These measures codified previous treaties and customary 
international law but also included innovations; as we will see, the 
measures proved effective in protecting the telegraph cable 
network, at least in times of peace.  The 1875 International 
Telegraph Convention (enacted with annexed Service Regulations 
to help govern operations), declared that “all persons” have a 
“right” to communicate by “international telegraph” and required 
states to “adopt all necessary measures to ensure the secrecy and 
prompt despatch of [telegraph correspondences].”39  These rights 
and protections – and others in the 1875 Telegraph Convention – 
drew upon similar provisions in earlier Conventions.  Indeed, the 
1871 Telegraph Convention, a product of the 1871–1872 Rome 
Conference, similarly recognized a “right of all persons to 
correspond by means of the International Telegraphs” (Article 4) 
and that signatory states would “undertake to adopt all necessary 
measures to insure the secrecy of messages, and their prompt 
despatch” (Article 5).40  The 1875 Telegraph Convention was meant 
to codify these articles as more “permanent” or “fundamental”; a 
reflection of the prior “decade of experience.”41 
Such expansive language was quite innovative for international 
legal measures at that time.  The traditional understanding in 
international law – both in the 19th Century right through most of 
the 20th – was that individuals were not the subjects of 
international law, only states, and that individuals themselves 
existed only at the “utmost periphery” of international legal 
                                                     
38  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 13 (“The most important conference was the 
one held in St. Petersburg in 1875.”). 
39  International Telegraph Convention art. II, July 22, 1875, 148 C.T.S. 416, 
available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/S02010000044002PDFF.pdf.  See International Telegraph Convention, 7 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 276 (Supp. 1913); FRANCIS LYALL, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION AND UNIVERSAL POSTAL 32–35 
(2011) (reprinting the Convention in English). 
40  International Telegraph Convention arts. IV, V, Jan. 14, 1872, 143 C.T.S. 
415, available at 
http://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/PlenipotentiaryConferences.aspx?conf=3
&dms=S0201000003. 
41  LYALL, supra note 39, at 33; HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 13 (“The most 
important [telegraph] conference was the one held in St. Petersburg in 1875.  Its 
convention codified the experience of the previous decade, including some 
important political decisions.”). 
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thinking.42  Thus, to have international legal documents in the 
1870s with such broad support bestowing “all persons” with a 
communication “right” with respect to the international telegraph 
network was a unique and innovative idea, arguably 
foreshadowing broader shifts in international law that would not 
come until a century later. 
Yet, beyond this recognition of individual rights, State interests 
were nevertheless essential to the telegraph network’s operation 
and protection.  Indeed, some commentators have read these 
provisions more narrowly; arguing that notwithstanding this lofty 
language, the Convention ensured national security was 
paramount because it reserved to States the right to stop 
transmission of any “private telegram” if not doing so was 
“dangerous” to the security of the State or contrary to order or 
morality.43   
However, that is not an entirely accurate reading because it 
ignores how the Convention operated in practice – with provisions 
on notice and the settling of accounts when telegrams are delayed 
or suspended, in both its Articles and annexed Service Regulations.  
Government  “censorship” of both private and state telegrams sent 
through the international telegraph system was explicitly dealt 
with in the 1875 Telegraph Convention – in Articles 7 and 8.  Such 
telegraph censorship involved what we would today consider state 
and state-sanctioned surveillance – government or military officials 
employed by telegraph companies and operators to monitor, 
suppress, and confiscate, for state purposes, “suspicious” cable 
                                                     
42 Andreas Muller, Review: The Individual in the International Legal System: 
Continuity and Change in International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 275, 275  (2012) 
(providing a review on KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010)) (“Whether 
and where to locate the individual in the universe of international law has become 
a standard question for the discipline.  While in the 19th and still in the early 20th 
centuries international legal doctrine could not see in the human person anything 
other than a mere object of international law, at the beginning of the 21st century, 
the individual presents itself as habitué of international law with major treatises 
dedicating a substantial number of pages, if not whole chapters to the topic.  The 
last hundred years have thus witnessed a remarkable development which has 
shifted the individual’s place in international law from the utmost periphery of 
the discipline to perhaps not its centre, but at least to its inner circles.”) (footnotes 
omitted).  See generally Ole Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 
18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 785 (2008). 
43  See, e.g., Magder, supra note 36, at 31–32 (highlighting that articles 6 and 7 
make clear that national security takes priority over the “right of 
communication.”). 
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messages.44  Article 7 is the central Convention provision dealing 
with telegraph censorship, which was limited to “private” 
telegrams: 
“The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to 
stop the transmission of any private telegram which may appear 
dangerous to the security of the State, or which may be contrary to 
the laws of the country, to public order, or decency.”45 
Similarly, Article 8 of the Convention conferred on signatory 
states the power to “suspend” the international telegraph service 
itself, more “generally” or certain “lines” for “any length of 
time.”46  Again, the right to “stop” telegrams (under Article 7) or 
“suspension” (under Article 8) provides states with an opportunity 
for surveillance, delay, and confiscation of any “suspicious” cables 
or telegrams being sent through the service.47  For state censors, 
these are some powerful tools to censor and survey telegraph 
communications. 
Yet, these “censorship” Articles were subject both to notice 
requirements and notifications via account settlement and 
reimbursement.  Explicit notice requirements for Article 8 are 
codified directly in its text: 
“Each government also reserves to itself the right to suspend 
the international telegraph service for an indefinite period, if it 
deem necessary; either generally or only upon certain lines and for 
certain classes of correspondence, upon condition that it 
immediately advises each of the other Contracting 
Governments.”48 
                                                     
44  Jill Hills, What’s New? War, Censorship, and Global Transmission, 68 INT’L 
COMMC’N GAZETTE 195, 197–98 (2006) (describing the appointment of “ex-military 
men” to work as “censors” at telegraph company stations who, with “knowledge 
of foreign languages” monitor cable messages sent through the company 
waystations and “delay” or confiscate “suspicious” messages, and relay said 
messages to the Chief Censor in London).  
45  International Telegraph Convention, supra note 39, art. VII.  The original 
French text of Article 7 is as follows: “Les Hautes Parties contractantes se 
réservent la faculté d’arrêter la transmission de tout télégramme privé qui 
paraîtrait dangereux pour la sécurité de L’Etat ou qui serait contraire aux lois du 
pays, à l’ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs.” 
46  Id. art. VIII.  
47  Id. arts. VII, VIII. 
48  International Telegraph Convention (1875), art. VIII, available at 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S02010000094002PDFE.pdf 
(emphasis added).  The original French text of Article 8 is as follows: 
Chaque Gouvernement se réserve aussi la faculté de suspendre le service 
de la télégraphie internationale pour un temps indéterminé, s’il le juge 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
710 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:3 
Therefore, notice must be sent to all other states if a state 
chooses to “suspend” telegraph communications for whatever 
reason.  Similarly, states exercising the right to “stop” private or 
non-state telegrams under Article 7 were required under (then) 
Service Regulation XL to “immediately” notify the 
“Administration,” that is, the authority responsible for regulating 
and administrating the telegraph system in a given state: 
 
The power reserved under Article 7 of the Convention of 
stopping the transmission of any private telegram which 
may appear dangerous to the security of the State, or which 
may be contrary to the laws of the country, to public order 
or decency, should only be made use of, on condition of 
immediately advising the Administration to which the 
original sending office belongs.49   
 
As Hills has noted, the widespread interpretation of the 
Regulation, or “normal practice,” was for the telegraph 
administrative authority “to inform the sender of the telegram,”50 
                                                     
nécessaire, soit d’une manière générale, soit seulement sur certaines 
lignes et pour certaines natures de correspondances, à charge par lui d’en 
aviser immédiatement chacun des autres Gouvernements contractants. 
49  International Telegraph Convention (1875), Service Regulation XL (English 
trans.), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/S02010000044002PDFF.pdf (emphasis added).  The official printing 
of this version of the Regulation was issued in French:  
Il ne doit être fait usage de la faculté réservée à l’article 7 de la 
Convention, d’arrêter la transmission de tout télégramme privé qui 
paraîtrait dangereux pour la sécurité de l’Etat, ou qui serait contraire aux 
lois du pays, à l’ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs qu’à charge d’en 
avertir immédiatement l’Administration de laquelle dépend le bureau 
d’origine. 
50  Hills, supra note 44, at 197.  This normal practice is also confirmed by 
comments in conference documents for the 1903 telegraph administrative 
conference.  In providing “observations” on a proposed change to Regulation 
XLVI (by 1903, Regulation XL had been re-numbered to XLVI due to subsequent 
amendments to Regulations in other administrative conferences, and its 1903 
version would be re-numbered again as XLV), the French delegation stated that 
“[p]ratiquement, le bureau d’origine est informé directement,” that is, 
“[p]ractically, the office of origin is informed directly.”  In other words, the office 
in which the sender sent a telegram was informed of an Article 7 stoppage or 
interruption.  Documents of the International Telegraph Conference of London, 
326 (1903), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/S02010000094802PDFF.pdf.  Hills, it should be noted, refers to the 
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and in fact, the language of Regulation XL would be later amended 
to reflect that reality.51  Any secretive and systematic telegram 
censorship and surveillance would obviously be undermined by 
these notice requirements.  Even if the normal practice was not 
necessarily to inform the sender, the risk of such notice being given 
– by a state telegraph authority – would be a serious problem for 
any covert surveillance program monitoring state espionage or 
other “threats,” because it could compromise its operations by 
disclosing its investigatory targets. 
In fact, there is a good reason why the “normal practice” was 
for telegraph administrative authorities to notify the sender: 
because senders would receive notice anyway by virtue of 
Convention Regulations “refund” provisions.  To promote the use 
of the telegraph system among the states, the International 
Telegraph Convention has important guarantees for transparent 
and fair accounting, including requirements for uniformity of 
charges for messages sent through the system (Article 10) and for 
states to “reciprocally . . . account” for any charges collected 
(Article 12).52  Similarly, when the telegraph fails to deliver 
telegrams, senders can be refunded.  Thus, when a state interferes 
with telegraph communications under Articles 7 or 8, Service 
Regulation LXX required the state to provide a refund: 
“When a telegram is stopped under Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Convention, the charge made for its transmission is returned to the 
sender and the refund is supported by the Administration which 
stopped the telegram.”53 
                                                     
later version of the 1903 version of Regulations.  As will be seen, one of the 
exceptions she discusses (avoiding notice for Article 8 suspensions when 
“dangerous” for security) would not be added until 1903, years after the all-
important 1875 conference, as tensions escalated before the First World War. 
51  In 1903, Germany proposed an amendment to the Regulation that would 
extend its Article 7 telegram stoppage notice requirements to include stoppages or 
interruptions of a telegram under Article 8.  France, supporting Germany’s 
proposal, also recommended changing the language of the Regulation to reflect 
the normal practice of states established by this time, which was to inform the 
sender by sending notice directly to the telegram’s office of origin (the French 
delegation stated, “[p]ratiquement, le bureau d’origine est informé directement” 
or, in English, “[p]ractically, the office of origin is informed directly”).  Both 
amendments were successful.  See generally Documents of the International 
Telegraph Conference of London (1903), supra note 50, at 326. 
52  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, art. X, XII 
(English trans.). 
53  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, at Service 
Regulation LXX (English trans.).  The official printing of this version of the 
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In other words, if a state censor stopped a telegram, then the 
sender would ultimately receive notice of that stoppage when he 
or she received a refund.  Again, such notice by individual refund 
would frustrate the whole strategic purpose of secret telegraph 
surveillance by “tipping off” senders that they were being secretly 
monitored. 
Together, these international legal measures effectively 
curtailed telegram communication censorship and surveillance 
operations.  Britain, for example, took steps to secretly establish an 
elaborate “censorship” system of telegram surveillance and 
blocking through its predominant control over key telegraph 
infrastructure; but by the 1890s, British officials questioned the 
system’s legality under the 1875 Telegraph Convention and 
reigned in operations.54  The weakest guarantee in the broader 
protective scheme was Article 8, which allowed states to stop 
entire classes of telegram correspondence (e.g., any private 
telegram that dealt with military goods).  Nevertheless, as of 1875, 
the Convention required general notice to all other contracting 
states on notice, and notice via refund for stoppage.  
 
3.1.2. Promoting Secrecy in Communications 
 
The 1875 Telegraph Convention promoted, and provided some 
important guarantees, for the use of secret codes and languages in 
telegrams communications.  These provisions were arguably 
precursors to more modern forms of “rights” to use encryption for 
secrecy and privacy.  The Convention not only recognized the 
aforementioned responsibility for states to “make all necessary 
provisions to [e]nsure the secrecy and quick dispatch” of telegraph 
communications, but also an express right to send private 
telegrams in “secret” code or language.55 
Interestingly, this right was also protected through a 
mandatory non-discrimination communication policy, an early 
notion of “network neutrality” at least concerning secret telegrams.  
That is, where a state did not (under national law) allow telegrams 
                                                     
Regulation was issued in French: “La taxe d’un télégramme arrêté en vertu des 
articles 7 et 8 de la Convention est remboursée à l’expéditeur et le remboursement 
est à la charge de l’Administration qui arrêté le télégramme.” 
54  Hills, supra note 44. 
55  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, art. VI.  
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to be sent in secret language or code, they were not to treat such 
communications any differently, like stopping telegrams written in 
secret code or “suspending” telegraph service to prevent their 
passage.  Rather, states were expressly obliged to allow any such 
secretly coded telegraph transmissions through their territory 
subject only to Article 8 suspension of services.  This meant that if 
states did not allow secretly coded messages, they had to notify all 
contracting states.56  In fact, different notions of neutrality in the 
broader telegraph network – like the uniform and neutral 
treatment of telecommunications traffic and charges – was a 
broader principle of the International Telegraph Convention, with 
Article 10 requiring the “charge for all messages exchanged, by the 
same route” be “uniform.”57  These Convention provisions, and the 
principles and aims underlying them, prevented states, at least 
without notice, from discriminating against “encrypted” or secretly 
encoded telegrams.58 
Despite often-rudimentary ciphers, codes, and “cryptographic” 
methods, these provisions were also effective in preserving secrecy 
and privacy in telegram communications.  Though codes and 
ciphers had been used in Europe since 1865, they proliferated 
among private enterprise after the 1875 Telegraph Convention, 
whose allowance for up to ten letters per “artificial” word 
eventually led to a “surge” in code making.59  Since international 
telegrams had to be routed through numerous international cable 
way stations and thus handled by a number of people, companies 
                                                     
56  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, arts. VI, VIII.  
57  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, art. X.  The 
original French text of Article 10 is as follows: 
Les Hautes Parties contractantes déclarent adopter, pour la formation 
des Tarifs internationaux, les bases ci-après:  
La taxe applicable à toutes les correspondances échangées, par la même 
voie, entre les bureaux de deux quelconques des Etats contractants sera 
uniforme. Un même Etat pourra toutefois, en Europe, être subdivisé, 
pour l’application de la taxe uniforme, en deux grandes divisions 
territoriales au plus. 
58   Hills, supra note 44, at 197. 
59  Albeit after some regulatory wrangling and strong push back against 
restrictions by private codemakers.  See HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 45 (“In 1890 
the Paris ITU conference decreed that an official ITU codebook would be written 
to replace all private codes.  Its publication in 1894 aroused such protests that the 
ITU had to back down and authorize existing codebooks.  Finally in 1903 the IUT 
surrendered to the private code makers and allowed artificial words of up to ten 
letters.  The result was a surge in code making . . . .”). 
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desired privacy and secrecy for confidential or strategic corporate 
communications through codes and ciphers.  As such, widespread 
use was driven by privacy and secrecy, but also economic factors: 
long distance telegrams had “astronomical” costs to send, and 
codes and ciphers reduced costs by replacing lengthier words with 
shorter artificial words or symbols.60  Widespread use of both 
secret and standardized codes and ciphers rendered the 
“economics” of telegraph censorship and surveillance pricey.  
Indeed, while states had capabilities to monitor telegram 
communications and, later, “break” secret codes, languages, and 
ciphers, their proliferation posed a significant problem for mass 
surveillance.  Code breaking was costly and time consuming, and 
as a result, state “censors” were very likely forced to focus on 
“specific targets.”61 
Beyond surveillance, cable-cutting legal measures were also 
taken.  The Submarine Cables Convention was similarly effective 
in protecting the physical infrastructure of the telegraph network.  
It deterred cable cutting with a range of prohibitions and 
requirements, including requiring states to compensate owners for 
damage done to cables.62  But again, this convention failed to 
address cable cutting among belligerent or warring states. 
 
3.1.3. From Consensus to Conflict and Control:                         
Censorship and Surveillance 
 
Despite success, these international measures’ failure to 
                                                     
60   HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 45. 
61  Hills, supra note 44, at 201 (describing how the mass of messages that they 
encountered forced focusing on specific targets); CHARLES M. DOLLAR & JOAN R. 
GUNDERSON, AMERICA, CHANGING TIMES 853 (2d ed. 1982) (“Much of this work of 
deciphering messages (1914–1918) was laborious and time consuming, still based largely 
upon frequency analysis. . .”); DAVID PAULL NICKLES, UNDER THE WIRE: HOW THE 
TELEGRAPH CHANGED DIPLOMACY 181 (2003) (discussing a story whereby the U.S. 
State Department officials found it time consuming and difficult to decode their 
own coded cables).  
62  Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 530, 537–38 
(1943) (discussing the provisions of the International Convention for the 
Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, including its provisions in article II 
providing for orders of “reparation” for damage done to cables by those 
responsible for “’[t]he breaking or injury of a submarine cable . . .’”). 
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properly address censorship, surveillance, and cable cutting during 
war was a major oversight.  This became a crucial flaw, once 
countries, namely Britain, started to understand how the global 
submarine cable network – most of which Britain owned or 
controlled – could be used to its national security and commercial 
advantage.  And while the international legal framework 
governing telegraph telecommunications tied Britain’s hands 
during peacetime; war, it would turn out, was another story. 
As earlier noted, telegraph cable network was initially seen as 
mostly beneficial to trade, commerce, and diplomacy rather than 
strategically.63  Yet, Britain was becoming increasingly aware of the 
telegraph system’s strategic and military value, particularly in light 
of the role of censorship and cable cutting in the Spanish-American 
and Boer Wars.64  In the Boer War, Britain installed military censors 
in Aden and Durban cable way stations, among others, and 
pursuant to Article 8 of the International Telegraph System, 
notified all other “contracting” states that it would be blocking all 
government “code” and “ciphered” telegrams from these cable 
stations linking Europe to South Africa.65  This “blatant 
interference with non-military traffic” caused considerable 
backlash, with governments like Germany and France questioning 
the legality of the British actions and requests for compensation 
from commercial enterprises flooding into the British telegraph 
administration.66 
These protests and requests for compensation ultimately forced 
the British Government to scale back the censorship, but a secret 
report by the British War Office concluded the censorship was a 
“success.”67  So, by 1900, British officials were “convinced” of both 
the value of telegraph “censorship” (and surveillance of cables to 
censor in practice) and – given the “futility” of existing “cipher” – 
the need for stronger cryptanalysis infrastructure.68  Yet, to be 
                                                     
63  Kennedy, supra note 24, at 729 (noting how the submarine cable was 
created as a means to contribute to the growth of trade and prosperity). 
64  Id.; see also Hills, supra note 44, at 199 (describing how the British 
government realized they could use the lines to censor commercial and financial 
transactions intended for the benefit of the enemy). 
65  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 88; Hills, supra note 44, at 199. 
66  Hills, supra note 44, at 199; HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 88.  
67  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 88–89 (stating that the War Office felt that the 
mere fact that the censorship existed was a success); Hills, supra note 44, at 199.  
68  Nicholas Hiley, The Strategic Origins of Room 40, 2 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L 
SEC. 245, 249 (1987); HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 63–66, 83–84.  
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clear, the War Office report noted that the “success” of the Boer 
War telegraph censorship and surveillance was not so much 
because military censors obtained foreign intelligence by 
confiscating telegrams, but simply because the Article 8 notice 
deterred any foreign interests from even sending strategically 
important telegrams.69  To ensure more effective, efficient, and 
secretive operations, changes to the international legal regime – 
defined primarily by the 1875 International Telegraph Convention 
– would need to be secured. 
Yet, this would not be a simple task.  Other world powers like 
France, Germany, and Russia, were jarred to reality by the way in 
which Britain had put its control over large portions of the global 
telegraph cable infrastructure to great strategic and military 
advantage during the war, despite being widely disruptive of 
communications among other neutral states.70  This was an 
important turning point in the fate of the international telegraph 
system.  It would first lead to a second cable laying “boom” as 
powers like Germany and France embarked on their own cable 
laying programs to “break” the British cable network monopoly.71  
It would also lead to an important clash at the subsequent 
international telegraph administrative conferences, as these powers 
worked to amend the Service Regulations – important to the 
operation of the 1875 International Telegraph Convention – to their 
advantage. 
One key difference between the 1875 Telegraph Convention 
and earlier permutations like the 1872 Rome Revision, was that it 
was much shorter (only a few pages long), codifying the central 
articles of the Convention in more simplified language and 
relegating more complex provisions concerning the operation of 
the articles to the Service Regulations.72  The idea was that the 1875 
Telegraph Convention would codify these articles as more 
“permanent” or “fundamental,”73 though the explicit text of the 
                                                     
69  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 88–89. 
70  Kennedy, supra note 24, at 748 (describing how the actions by the British 
spurred new cable construction by countries such as France and the United 
States). 
71  Kennedy, supra note 24, at 748; HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 111 (describing 
how the actions by the British caused a cable rivalry). 
72  LYALL, supra note 39, at 32.  
73  LYALL, supra note 39, at 33; HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 13 (“The most 
important [telegraph] conference was the one held in St. Petersburg in 1875.  Its 
convention codified the experience of the previous decade, including some 
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Convention, under Articles 13 and 15, indicated that the Service 
Regulations “completed” the Convention and were of the same 
value as the Convention itself.74  Nevertheless, the 1875 
Convention would only be amended in larger diplomatic 
conferences while the supposedly less important Service 
Regulations could be changed in the smaller and more frequently 
held administrative conferences.75  On one level, this strategy 
“worked,” as the 1875 version of the International Telegraph 
Convention would not be changed for decades – not until 1932.76 
On another level, as we will see, easier revision of the Service 
Regulations would ultimately mean the undoing of much of these 
key Telegraph Convention protections against mass telegram 
censorship, surveillance, and control. 
The very next International Telegraph Administrative 
Conference, held in London in 1903, would prove consequential. 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia, and several other state 
delegations to the conference, would clash bitterly over changes 
proposed to the earlier discussed Service Regulation XL (now 
“XLVI,” re-numbered due to changes to regulations in earlier 
years).  This Regulation, as noted, required that any stoppage of 
telegrams under Article 7 – for reasons of national security, 
legality, or public order or decency – required “immediate” notice 
to the state telegraph authority of the sending office with “normal” 
state practice under this requirement being “to inform the sender 
of the telegram.”77  This Regulation, in effect, guarded against 
covert telegram surveillance and stoppage because such practices 
would be disclosed or compromised by notice to senders. 
Germany proposed extending these important individualized 
notice requirements to stoppages under Article 8, with France 
strongly supporting the amendment in debates about its 
                                                     
important political decisions.”). 
74  International Telegraph Convention (1875), supra note 39, art. XIII, XV.  
75  LYALL, supra note 39, at 33. 
76  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 14 (“St. Petersburg was the last diplomatic 
conference on telegraph matters until 1932.  After it came a series of 
administrative conferences attended by representatives of the various telegraph 
administrations during the following years: 1879, 1885, 1890, 1903, 1908, 1925, and 
1928 . . .”); LYALL, supra note 39, at 32–33. 
77  Hills, supra note 44, at 197.  This normal practice is also confirmed by 
comments of the French delegation to the 1903 conference in stating that 
“[p]ratiquement, le bureau d’origine est informé directement,” or, that in practice, 
the office of origin is informed directly.  Documents of the International Telegraph 
Conference (1903), supra note 50. 
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ratification.78  Their aim was likely to curtail future Article 8 abuses 
like the broad telegram disruptions employed by Britain during 
the Boer War under the authority of Article 8.  Not surprisingly, 
Britain and Russia raised the strongest opposition to the 
amendment, with Japan and British India voicing concerns, while 
Hungary, Turkey, and Netherlands proposed compromises.79  
Britain and Russia shared similar concerns, stating such notice 
requirements for Article would be too onerous, or dangerous as 
notice would tip off targets of the stoppages, or that notice may 
disclose existing censorship operations.80  Eventually, after 
prompting from Turkey, Netherlands, and Hungary to 
accommodate Britain and Russia’s concerns about security, 
Germany offered a compromise:  notice would be mandatory for 
Article 8 stoppages except where it would appear dangerous to the 
security of the State (“[s]auf les cas où il paraîtrait dangereux pour la 
sécurité de l’Etat”).81 
This compromise proposal to amend the Service Regulation 
notice requirements for Article 8 was accepted and ratified as the 
last act of the 1903 International Telegraph Conference.  
Unfortunately, it would utterly undermine the Convention’s 
protections against large-scale telegraph censorship.  Shortly after 
the Conference in 1904, the British War Office prepared a memo 
entitled “Censorship of Submarine Cables in Time of War,” which 
noted this new exception to notice requirements and 
recommended that any suspensions or stoppages under Article 8 
would be treated as “dangerous for the security of the State” and 
so no notice would ever be given.82  In other words, it provided 
legal authority for secretive telegraph censorship and surveillance.  
The exception also effectively undermined the other indirect notice 
provisions established in 1875 – the refunds sent to senders for 
stoppages of their telegrams under Article 8 and 9.  This is because 
for years the Service Regulations were changed – in a seemingly 
benign amendment by the then Commission of Regulations (which 
included Britain, among others) at an administrative telegraph 
conference in 1879 also, coincidentally, in London – providing that 
                                                     
78  Documents of the International Telegraph Conference (1903), supra note 
50, at 326, 669–72.  
79  Id. at 669–72. 
80  Id. at 670–72. 
81  Id. at 672. 
82  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 98; Hills, supra note 44, at 199.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 719 
refunds would only be provided if they were demanded by the 
sender.83  Without notice that their telegram has been stopped, it 
was difficult for the senders to make a demand. 
The small 1903 exception, a seemingly minor compromise, 
undermined the system of checks established in 1875.  By 1908, 
with the world creeping towards war, a secret British “Inter-
Departmental Committee” was established to set up, and build, a 
system of “secret censorship.”84  Of course, Britain was not alone in 
making these moves towards covert telegram surveillance and 
censorship.  The 1903 “exception” led to pervasive cable 
censorship, surveillance, and espionage during World War I, with 
state infrastructure created to conduct “war time” communications 
surveillance, cryptography, and censorship.  After World War I, 
this became permanent or “peacetime” state surveillance or signal 
intelligence agencies.85  For example, Britain’s war time 
surveillance infrastructure would become a permanent peace-time 
agency in 1919 (called the Government Code and Cypher School); a 
department that would be expanded and renamed Government 
Communications Headquarters or GCHQ before the Second World 
War.86 
Moreover, the Submarine Convention also neglected war times, 
and cable cutting between hostile states became increasingly 
common in the early 20th Century.  In fact, submarine cable cutting 
was likely the first pre-meditated act of the First World War, when 
                                                     
83  Documents of the International Telegraph Conference of London, 551 
(1879), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/S02010000054802PDFF.pdf.   
The change in the language of Regulation LXVIII can be seen in the Official 1879 
version of the Regulations (I have underlined the newly added text): “La taxe 
d’un télégramme arrêté en vertu des articles 7 et 8 de la Convention est 
remboursée  à  l’expéditeur, s’il en fait la demande, et le remboursement est  à  la 
charge de l’Administration qui a arrêté le télégramme.”  International Telegraph 
Convention (1875), Service Regulations, Tariffs, and Annexes, London Revision 
(1879), at Service Regulation LXVII, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/S02010000054002PDFF.PDF (emphasis added). 
84  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 98; Hills, supra note 44, at 199.  
85  Hills, supra note 44, at 197, 199–201 (noting particularly, that “secret” 
censorship and surveillance continued after the war). 
86  F.H. Hinsley & Alan Stripp, Preface, in CODEBREAKERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
BLETCHLEY PARK, at v (F.H. Hinsley & Alan Stripp eds., 1993) (“Just before the 
outbreak of the Second World War the Government Code and Cypher School 
(GC&CS) moved from London to Bletchley Park[,] . . . variously known as War 
Station X, . . . the Park, or Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
. . .”); see HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 219–24. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
720 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:3 
Britain and France cut German submarine cables spanning the 
Atlantic and North Sea on August 9, 1914.87  Indeed, ambiguities 
and shortcomings in all of these international instruments 
rendered them inadequate to resist censorship, surveillance, or 
other cable communication disruptions.  With no recourse under 
international treaty or convention, for example, non-state actors 
(i.e. companies) turned to litigation in national and international 
judicial forums to seek redress for cables damaged during war.  
For example, in the 1923 Case of the Cuba Submarine Telegraph 
Company, the British government (on behalf of British companies) 
famously brought a claim against the United States in the United 
Nations International Claims Tribunal, seeking compensation 
under customary international law principles for cables cut during 
the Spanish-American War.  Though mostly unsuccessful, a few 
instances of high litigation did pressure or shame countries into 
settling damages.88 
 
3.1.4. From Conflict and Control to Innovation 
 
Though the Telegraph Convention was later revised, no 
agreement was ever settled upon to address telegraph 
communications at war.  However, the idea that cable 
communications between neutral countries, even during wartime, 
were “inviolable” and thus should remain free of disruption was 
largely established.  Articulated by the Institute of International 
Law in 1878, this principle had near universal acceptance89 and 
was largely codified in Article 54 of the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 1907.90  Britain, through its control over vast segments of the 
                                                     
87  UNITED NATIONS, 6 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 118 
(2006), available at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_VI/118-
120_Cuba_Submarine.pdf (presenting the decision of Cuba Submarine Telegraph 
Co., Ltd. (Great Britain) v. United States (1923)). 
88  Higgins, supra note 21, at 30. 
89  R. J. R. Goffin, Submarine Cables in Time of War, 15 L.Q. REV. 145, 152 (1899) 
(“The only definite rule for practice that can be extracted from the conclusions of 
the Institute is that which declares cables connecting two neutral territories 
inviolable, a rule which would probably meet with universal acquiescence.”). 
90  Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 187 C.T.S. 227, art. 54 (“Submarine cables connecting an occupied 
territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case 
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international telegraph system, had established unchallenged 
supremacy in global communications during the First World War 
through its extensive telegraph infrastructure and secret programs 
of censorship – such that it could block or read “most secret 
messages of its enemies” but do so without detection or “revealing 
its sources.”91  This would represent the high-watermark of British 
strength in global communications, leading other states to look to 
new technologies – in particular the wireless telegraph – in attempt 
to “free themselves from dependence on foreign cables.”92   Indeed, 
innovation became the means by which the international 
community moved on from these information conflicts.  Cable-
based telegraph communications became less important in the 
years after the Great War, with the development of the wireless 
telegraph and radio communications.93   
 
3.2. Case Study Two:  High Frequency Radio Jamming 
 
Freedom of information and radio jamming were major 
international issues after the Second World War.  This prominence 
was due not only to U.S. influence – whose foreign policy was 
centered on First Amendment values – but also developments 
during the war itself.94  Both war propaganda and state censorship, 
enabled by radio transmission jamming, were pervasive during the 
war and viewed by the world community as a serious threat to 
peace and stability.95  The development of high frequency 
shortwave radio technology before the war – which made the 
transnational propagation of radio broadcasts possible – led 
countries like Germany to deploy a war strategy of “broadcast 
defense” involving systematic jamming of foreign radio stations.96  
                                                     
of absolute necessity.  They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed 
when peace is made.”).  
91  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 169. 
92  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 8.  
93  Magder, supra note 36, ch. 2. 
94  See Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and 
Intellectual Origins, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 10, 21–22 (2011) (discussing the 
origins and history of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm). 
95 Id. at 21–23. 
96  See James G. Savage & Mark W. Zacher, Free Flow Versus Prior Consent: The 
Jurisdictional Battle over International Telecommunications, 42 INT’L J. 342, 344–47 
(1987) (discussing broadcasting and deliberate indifference). 
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So, when state measures to control new radio technologies would 
eventually emerge in the Post-War Period, those efforts would be 
focused less on surveillance and more on disrupting and 
interfering with long range telecommunications.  As we will see, 
international responses then attempted to respond in kind. 
 
3.2.1. The Post War Consensus:                                                       
The Free Flow of Information Doctrine 
 
But first:  the Post-War consensus.  With the proliferation of the 
high frequency radio – making mass telecommunications possible 
– a strong consensus formed to promote the technology, through 
an international policy framework promoted by the U.S. and its 
allies:  the “free flow of information” doctrine.97  That is, the 
promotion of unrestricted global flows of information and ideas 
across state borders.  The free flow doctrine, it was argued, could 
address state propaganda and censorship at the same time, 
undermining both with a diverse array of information sources.98  
The consensus on the free flow doctrine was reflected in the near 
complete absence of any radio jamming after the war.99  It was also 
reflected in the wide range of international conventions, 
declarations, and agreements established at the time that codified 
the doctrine’s principles, like the right to “seek, receive, and impart 
information” enshrined in article 19 of the United Nations’ 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)100 and the UN’s 
1946 Declaration on Freedom of Information – which declared 
information freedom a “fundamental human right” – adopted 
unanimously in the General Assembly’s first session.101 
                                                     
97  Penney, supra note 93, at 23; see generally Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 
348. 
98  Penney, supra note 94, at 22–23. 
99  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 348 (“Immediately after the  end  of  the  
war  jamming  was  virtually absent  from the  air  waves.”). 
100  Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to . . . seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”). 
101  Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information, G.A. 
Res. 59 (I) (Dec. 14, 1946) [hereinafter Conference on Freedom of Information] 
(“Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of 
all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated”); Penney, supra note 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 723 
 
3.2.2. From Consensus to Conflict and Control:                                   
Radio Jamming & Cold War Information Politics 
 
This early Post War consensus on the free flow doctrine 
weakened as U.S.-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, after the 
Soviet Union began jamming U.S. radio broadcasts directed at 
Russia in 1948.102  The Soviets, and their allies in the Eastern bloc, 
would continue to jam Western broadcasts, such as the BBC, Voice 
of America, Radio Free Europe, and Liberty Radio, for most of the 
Cold War.103  Freedom of information would become a flashpoint 
for international legal disputes between East and West, with the 
West promoting the free flow of information and the Soviets 
advocating the sovereign right of states to restrict it.104 
These struggles over information law and politics would take 
place across a vast range of international forums, including the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), UNESCO, and the 
UN General Assembly.  Notwithstanding the West’s success in 
                                                     
94, at 23–30; see CEES J. HAMELINK, THE POLITICS OF WORLD COMMUNICATION: A 
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 60 (1994) (examining the global communication 
environment and the political process and decision-making that shape this 
environment). 
102  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 348. 
103  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 348 (“Immediately after the end of the 
war jamming was virtually absent from the air waves.  However, in 1946 the 
Soviet Union began to jam Russian-language shortwave programmes from 
Franco's Spain.  Following a significant deterioration in American-Soviet relations 
and the establishment of the Russian and East European language services of the 
Voice of America, the Soviet Union decided in late 1947 to commit a dozen 
transmitters to full-time jamming of the new VOA services.  It began in February 
1948.”); Price, supra note 14, at 391; (“The Soviet Union began to jam Western 
radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1948. . . .  The prime targets of Soviet and 
East European jamming are the three major Western foreign broadcast stations, 
the BBC's External Broadcasting Services, the Voice of America (VOA), and Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). . .”) (footnotes omitted); Jamie F. Metzl, 
Rwandan Genocide  and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT’L. L. 628, 
629 (1997) (“With the real and metaphorical fall of the Berlin Wall, this formerly 
neat division between sides became murkier.  In 1988 Moscow ceased operation of 
its twenty-five hundred jamming stations and allowed Radio Free Europe and 
Voice of America broadcasts to flow in unimpeded. U.S. funding for such 
activities decreased dramatically.  Control of the airwaves became a much less 
ideologically contested issue in international fora.”) (foonotes omitted). 
104  Id. at 347–48. 
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having radio jamming prohibited and the free flow doctrine 
recognized in numerous international documents and forums – for 
example, every ITU resolution from 1947 onward condemned 
radio jamming – such measures did little to deter Soviet jamming 
activities, whom often cited national security justifications.105  As 
with telegraph cable cutting, international law’s failure to settle 
disputes over radio jamming and international broadcasting led 
some states and non-state actors to seek redress in alternative 
measures or forums, such as the International Frequency 
Registration Board (IFRB), the ITU’s enforcement arm, which 
established both a global radio jamming monitor and a formal 
complaints process for states seeking redress.106 
 
3.2.3. Additional International Measures:                                        
IFRB Radio Jamming Monitoring 
 
The IFRB was initially set up to resolves disputes concerning 
interference with international broadcasts, and to administer and 
enforce the terms of the International Telecommunications 
Convention (ITC) and its annexed Radio Regulations.107  But as is 
typically the case when international consensus breaks down over 
telecommunications policy, consensus-based institutions, such as 
the ITU, are paralyzed.  Indeed, due to the divisive nature of Cold 
War international politics, the IFRB’s strict enforcement capacity 
was seriously weakened.108  However, one of the IFRB’s more 
successful Cold War projects – which could have been a great long 
term international effort if given the chance – was its global “radio 
interference” or radio jamming monitoring program.109  The 
                                                     
105  Id. at 343–44, 348, 362–63. 
106  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 355 (discussing that the U.S. used the 
IFRB in order to seek a settlement with the Soviet Union). 
107 Price, supra note 14, at 402 n.28 (“The administration, enforcement and 
interpretation of this body of law is handled by the International Frequency 
Registration Board (IFRB).”). 
108 See Madelaine Eppenstein & Elizabeth J. Aisenberg, Radio Propaganda in the 
Contexts of International Regulation and the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right, 
5 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 154, 158–59 (1979) (discussing the reality of international 
broadcasting regulations). 
109  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 362; see Bob Parnass, Feds Finger Radio 
Jammers Again, BELL LABS REPORT (1989), available at 
http://cd.textfiles.com/hamradio/swl/swlguid2/jammer.txt (discussing 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 725 
program offers an intriguing role for international institutions to 
play – in particular the ITU – in relation to global 
telecommunications censorship and disruption, during periods of 
sustained international conflict about a technology or its 
governance. 
Given the highly charged international disputes over radio 
jamming, few countries, other than the Soviet Union, went on the 
record as saying that they were deploying jamming.  Thus, there 
was little information available about the location, scope, and 
spillover effects of jamming activities.110  The IFRB’s monitoring 
program was the first globally coordinated attempt to monitor and 
map those details, and was quite sophisticated, with the IFRB 
working with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) to use “radio direction finding equipment” 
and “HF monitoring” around the world to locate jammers.111  The 
IFRB’s radio jamming monitoring was established in response to 
Western lobbying at the ITU’s 1984 High Frequency World 
                                                     
characteristics of the radio jamming monitoring program); see Bob Parnass, 
Shortwave Jammers Identified, BELL LABS REPORT (1987), available at 
ftp://69.43.38.172/mirrors/cd.textfiles.com/hamradio3/news/inham08/974 
(raising questions as to whether using shielded cables on the computer reduces 
risk of static discharges from the body). 
110  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 362; Parnass (1989), supra note 109; 
Parnass (1987), supra note 109.  
111 It took radio jamming to reach “record levels” in 1984 to spur the IFRB 
radio jamming monitoring program to be established. See MARY W. SOWERS & 
GREGORY R. HAND, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REPORT 90-262: MONITORING 
OF HARMFUL INTERFERENCE TO THE HF BROADCASTING SERVICE: SUMMARY OF 
MONITORING PROGRAMS HELD BETWEEN 1984 AND 1989 2–3 (1990) (“In 1984, 
broadcast services into the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries were being 
jammed at record levels.  The First Session of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference (WARC) for planning the frequencies allocated to the HF broadcasting 
service was held in February, 1984.  This conference, designated WARC-
HFBC(84), decided that coordinated worldwide monitoring programs to identify 
and locate sources of harmful interference to the HF broadcast service be initiated 
under the  auspices of the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) . . . .  
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) 
Institute for Telecommunication Sciences (ITS) led a highly coordinated effort 
using HF monitoring and radio direction finding equipment located around the 
world to determine the 1ocation and extent of jamming to international broadcast 
services.”).  The author is aware of no other global radio jamming monitoring 
program undertaken by the ITU or any comparable international body.  For a 
discussion of the “planning principles and technical parameters” of the 
monitoring program, see Charles Rush, George Jacobs & Warren Richards, The 
Results of WARC-HFBC(87): Technical Implications, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
BROADCASTING 102 (1988). 
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Administrative Radio Conference (HF-WARC).112  Radio 
broadcasts were being jammed around the world in 1984 at 
“record levels,” with no real recourse for states or international 
broadcasters under treaty or convention.113  Perhaps seeking 
alternative means to fight the jamming activities, Western 
governments persuaded the HF-WARC to issue a resolution 
requesting the IFRB to monitor and report on radio jamming 
around the world.114 
The IFRB, working jointly with the U.S. National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 
established a globally coordinated effort to monitor the location 
and extent of international radio broadcast jamming worldwide.115  
In reports issued in 1985, 1986, and 1987, the IRFB set out the 
location of 100 sources of global radio jamming, and found most of 
these sites were located in Soviet or Eastern bloc country 
territory.116  These reports were tabled at the 1987 HF-WARC, 
formally confirming radio-jamming activities being conducted by 
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, as well as 
a number of smaller developing countries. The aim was to stir 
more international pressure on jamming countries to cease, or at 
least scale back, their activities.117  Interestingly, by the time of the 
second session of the 1987 HF broadcast conferences, jamming had 
“diminished considerably.”118  Though certain Western broadcasts 
such as Voice of America remained jammed for various languages 
in the USSR, jamming activities in smaller Eastern bloc were 
significantly scaled back, and in some countries like Poland, they 
ceased completely.119 
As with other instances in which jamming activities received 
international attention, the Soviet government was undeterred. 
Smaller states, such as developing countries or those in the Eastern 
                                                     
112  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 361–62 (“The matter was tackled again 
at the opening session of the High Frequency-World Administrative Radio 
Conference (HF- WARC) of 1984 and as a result of Western prodding, a resolution 
was passed requesting the IFRB to monitor and report on jamming activities.”). 
113   SOWERS & HAND, supra note 111, at 2. 
114  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 361–62. 
115  Id. at 2–3. 
116  Id. at 2–3. 
117  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 362. 
118  SOWERS & HAND, supra note 111, at 2–3. 
119  SOWERS & HAND, supra note 111, at 2–3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 727 
bloc, became increasingly responsive to monitoring.  They may, as 
James Savage and Mark Zacher have suggested, have felt 
“constrained from jamming because of cost or the possible damage 
to their reputations . . . .”120  With a global platform, the ITU 
program imposed a significant reputational cost for radio jamming, 
creating a greater deterrent effect.  Of course, there were other 
complex factors at play here with Cold War tensions easing by the 
late 1980s.121  Yet IFRB monitoring and reporting, with its robust 
methodology and technical sophistication,122 constituted the “gold 
standard” in radio jamming tracking, with its high profile reports 
likely seen as both sufficiently credible and objective to impact 
reputation – a Cold War precursor to contemporary efforts to map 
and track global Internet censorship. 
Beyond such censorship monitoring, international law, 
however, again offered little recourse for victims of censorship and 
jamming, leading states and interested parties on either side of the 
Cold War radio jamming divide, to pursue other avenues.  One 
avenue or measure for recourse was the IFRB complaints process. 
Although, as earlier noted, the IFRB had little actual enforcement 
capability, its pronouncements nevertheless brought to bear some 
pressure on states acting in breach of the ITU Convention and 
Radio Regulations.  This was apparent in the radio jamming 
disputes between Cuba and the United States.  In the 1960s, Cuba 
began jamming radio broadcasts originating in the southern U.S., 
and would do so, off and on, for most of the Cold War.123  Though 
there was some concern that the disputes would lead to a military 
confrontation, no conflict materialized.  Instead, both countries, 
among other actions, utilized international and national formal 
complaints processes.124  Both, for example, lodged formal 
complaints against each other with the IFRB, which would 
investigate and issue compliance rulings in response to complaints 
that state governments, or non-state actors in state territories, were 
violating ITC rules or regulations.  Cuba also lodged complaints 
                                                     
120  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 362. 
121  See Parnass (1989), supra note 109 (noting that “closer” East/West 
relations led to a decrease in jamming). 
122  See generally SOWERS & HAND, supra note 111 (describing the methodology 
of the IRFB reports); Parnass (1987), supra note 109. 
123  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 350. 
124  Omar Javier Arcia, War over the Airwaves: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. 
and Cuban Views on International Law and Policy Governing Transnational Broadcasts, 
5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 199, 203–05 (1996). 
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with the U.S. Government about anti-Fidel Castro radio broadcasts 
being transmitted into Cuba, with some leading to FCC action to 
shut down un-licensed pirate radio broadcasts.125 
Both countries achieved some success with these complaints. 
Though the IFRB was unable to enforce its findings, its 
investigations into Cuban radio jamming pushed the Cuban 
government to the negotiating table in various international 
forums,126 and overall, Cuban jamming efforts were never more 
“than limited and half-hearted.”127  From the Cuban standpoint, 
the FCC closed down anti-communist and anti-Castro pirate radio 
states in Florida in 1980 in response to their complaints.128  Much 
like the less powerful developing and Eastern bloc countries that 
the IFRB’s monitoring program exposed, Cuba appeared 
responsive to bad press and international exposure for its jamming 
activities. 
                                                     
125  Id. at 202.  Hazel G. Warlaumont, Strategies in International Radio Wars: A 
Comparative Approach, 32 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 43, 51 (1988) (“The U.S. and 
Cuba held bilateral talks on radio interference before and after the 1981 Rio 
Conference, and even during the tense times when Radio Marti was introduced 
both the U.S. and Cuba engaged in some diplomatic activities.  For instance, Cuba 
sent the U.S. a formal written protest about Radio Marti and the U.S. sent a 
private envoy to Havana attempting to soften the impact of the new program . . 
.”); William Labbee, Cuba Over and Out, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Nov. 21, 1990), 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/cuba-over-and-out-6365139 
(“Coincidentally, listeners in Miami neighborhoods and Cuban cities, towns, and 
villages tuned in their short-wave sets four days per week to hear the gravelly 
voice of Comandante David, who claimed to be broadcasting from somewhere on 
the island and who called for the overthrow of Fidel Castro in explosive diatribes 
against the dictator. . . .  So began the most-celebrated case involving anti-Castro 
clandestine radio in the U.S., a case that eventually would lead to ten years of 
pursuits and disputes between the FCC and broadcasters, between Cuba and the 
U.S. government, and between the FCC and the White House.  Castro complained 
to the U.S. government about David in late 1979, and by early 1980 the FCC had 
pinpointed the radio signal to a house at 8780 SW 51st St., the residence of Jose M. 
Gonzalez, a 47-year-old exile from Santa Clara, Cuba.  Agents warned Gonzalez to 
quit broadcasting, but the ten- to fifteen-minute programs, broadcast on Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday nights and on Sunday afternoons, continued unabated, 
including references to attempts to shut down the transmissions.  U.S. marshals 
twice raided Gonzalez's house in 1980, confiscating broadcasting equipment.”). 
126  Id. at 204. 
127  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 350. 
128 See generally Arcia, supra note 124, at 202; Warlaumont, supra note 125, at 
53; Labbee, supra note 125.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/2
PENNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:02 PM 
2015] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION CENSORSHIP 729 
 
3.3. Case Study Three:  Direct Broadcast Satellite TV Jamming 
 
Once again, new innovations pushed the “cycle” into a 
different stage:  namely, the development of communications 
satellites drove international telecommunications and debates into 
new regulatory controversies.  Thus, our final case study of global 
telecommunications disruption concerns international disputes 
over direct-to-receiver satellite broadcasting, or direct broadcast 
satellite (DBS), in the 1970s. 
 
3.3.1. The COMSAT Consensus 
 
When communications satellites first went online in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the world community’s initial response was, 
unsurprisingly, very positive.  There was a strong consensus about 
the great potential for global satellite communications, including 
the opening up of a new frontier for exploration:  space.129  This 
idealism, like past consensus about the telegraph or radio, would 
be reflected in international norms, particularly the 1967 Treaty on 
Outer Space, which reflected these ideals and was supported by 
the most important world powers at the time:  the U.S., Russia, and 
the United Kingdom.  The Treaty declared “space” a neutral zone 
and a common space for all humanity.130 
 
                                                     
129  See Eilene Galloway, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Space Law, 3 J. SPACE L. 
3, 3 (1975) (emphasizing the great benefits to “mankind” of satellite being 
effectively recognized in the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space); see also Nancy M. 
Lesko, Legal Implications of Direct Satellite Broadcasting—The UN Working Group, 6 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 564, 564 (1976) (speaking of satellite fostered changes as the 
“greatest technological  revolution  in  history. . .”). 
130   Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 
2222 (XXI), opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
(entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) (“Outer space . . . shall be free for exploration 
and use by all States . . . on a basis of equality and in accordance with 
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”).  
See also Galloway, supra note 129, at 3 (noting that space increased man’s 
knowledge of the universal and had practical implications for all of humanity); 
Lesko, supra note 129, at 564 (stressing that the world community must 
acknowledge the interdependence of the legal and technical aspects of DBS). 
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3.3.2. From Consensus to Conflict and Control 
 
Like other global telecommunications technologies, the 
international consensus about satellite communications did not 
last.  In fact, the seeds of its demise were already planted by the 
late 1960s, as DBS was being developed.131  DBS provided the 
capability to beam television signals directly to targeted 
populations across national borders.132  Eventually, states around 
the world began to understand the true potential – and threat – 
posed by satellite telecommunications technology, in this form.133  
Not surprisingly, DBS stirred international controversy and, like 
other global communications conflicts during the Cold War, led to 
disputes about the legality of states blocking or jamming DBS 
signals.134  The COMSAT consensus had broken down, leading to 
conflict and attempts at control.  Early on, international lawyers 
and legal scholars questioned whether traditional “state 
sovereignty” justifications for communications jamming – based on 
theories of territorial control over airwaves or national security – 
could justify satellite jamming or blocking.135  Since satellites 
operated far beyond the airspace that international law recognized 
as subject to territorial control, the airwave theory was 
inapplicable.136  The national security justification was also weak, 
given that satellite jamming often meant interfering with the 
                                                     
131  See Lesko, supra note 129, at 564–65 (observing that the Treaty on Outer 
Space failed to deal with the more “difficult” earthbound activities, including 
direct broadcast satellite).  
132  Galloway, supra note 129, at 15–16 (noting transmission directly to private 
sets); Lesko, supra note 129, at 565 (pointing out the rapid rise of such technology). 
133  Galloway, supra note 129, at 15–16 (describing several international 
controversies around DBS); Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 344; Lesko, supra 
note 129, at 565–66. 
134  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 357. 
135  Samuel D. Estep & Amalya L Kearse, Space Communications and the Law: 
Adequate International Control After 1963?, 60 MICH. L. REV. 873, 877–79 (1962) (“The 
general consensus of the majority of jurists is that existing international 
agreements recognize the sovereignty of a state over its superjacent ‘airspace,’ and 
that space beyond the earth's atmosphere is not included. . . .  The first such 
problem presented is the choice between the theories upon which a state may 
claim the right to jam a ‘transgressing’ radio signal.  Neither the sovereignty-over-
airspace theory nor the national security theory is entirely satisfactory, both 
allowing jamming in instances which seem not to justify interference. . .”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
136 Id. at 877. 
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capabilities of the satellite itself, preventing it from broadcasting at 
all.137 
These questions concerning the legality of regulating or 
jamming DBS, led to good faith international efforts to negotiate a 
treaty to cover DBS communications and transmissions.138  
However, international law largely gave way to international 
politics.  In contrast to the East-West divide on radio jamming, the 
politics of DBS were complex.  Television’s cultural and political 
power far exceeded radio, and many states perceived DBS as a 
threat to national control over television broadcasting.139  Nations 
subsequently divided along three lines over DBS:  the U.S. and 
some developed Western countries advocated for the free flow of 
communications, the Soviet and its Eastern bloc allies pushed for 
full jamming powers, and a third group of countries, mainly 
developing nations, supported more moderate regulatory powers 
over DBS transmissions.140  This new regulatory coalition – 
between the “East” and “South“ – was successful in promoting its 
agenda in various international forums, such as the ITU, UNESCO, 
and the UN General Assembly.  For example, it achieved some 
recognition for the concept of “prior consent,” that is, DBS should 
not be transmitted into a state’s territory without its prior consent 
in a General Assembly resolution in 1972, with 102 voting in 
support and only the United States voting against.141  This was 
later referred to as the “Jammers Charter.”142  Though never 
formalized, the notion of prior consent only complicated relevant 
law and weakened the case for free flow of information principles. 
 
4. UNDERSTANDING THE “CYCLES” (IF THEY EVEN EXIST. . .) 
 
Beyond a historical examination of global communications 
disruption, surveillance, or censorship, do these cases offer any 
insights, lessons, or implications for Internet censorship resistance 
                                                     
137  Id. at 878. 
138  Id. at 877–79.  See also Juliana Maio, Direct Broadcasting by Satellite: A 
Domestic and International Legal Controversy, 1 COMMENT L.S. 193 (1978). 
139  Lesko, supra note 129, at 567–68 (noting controversy over “cultural 
propaganda”); Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 344–45. 
140  Savage & Zacher, supra note 96, at 357–59. 
141  Id. at 359. 
142  Id. at 359. 
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today?  I believe so.  A central question Wu poses in Master Switch 
is “Will this time be different?”  That is, will the Internet, perhaps 
the most powerful global telecommunications technology yet, 
regress toward the seeming “inevitable” pattern of information 
industries before it:  a move to monopoly, centralization, and 
ultimate closure?143  Wu is not certain as to the right answer – and 
gives some reason for both optimism and pessimism – while 
suggesting vigilance to “preserve [the Internet’s] openness from 
imperial designs.”144 
These case studies do not provide an answer either, but they do 
add an important layer of international complexity to Wu’s 
question, suggesting comparable regulatory patterns but with 
distinctive features, given their global or international context.  
This, itself, offers some important insight into the regulatory 
challenges that global telecommunications technologies, like the 
Internet, are most likely to face.  If we were to adopt Wu’s 
framework to a global communications level, it would likely look 
something like Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
Do the Case Studies Support this Adaption of Wu’s “Cycle” 
in the Global Telecommunications Context? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet, answering Wu’s question arguably also requires more than 
                                                     
143   WU, supra note 3, at 6, 316–19. 
144  WU, supra note 3, at 318. 
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merely adopting or mapping his theory onto global technologies.  
To explore that problem at the very least requires understanding 
the nature of the regulatory challenge. 
The analysis thus far of the three case studies certainly 
provides some support for Wu’s notion of regulatory cycles on a 
global stage, as seen in Figure 1.2.  At the same time, however, one 
could also take issue with the uniformity of how the “patterns” are 
represented.  There was certainly a “consensus” period concerning 
both the telegraph in the mid-19th Century and the shortwave 
radio after the Second World War, but both were remarkably brief; 
the same could be said for the “COMSAT” consensus concerning 
communication satellites.145  The rest of the time, states competed 
both offensively and defensively in relation to the given global 
telecommunications technology.  One could say these brief 
prosperous periods were marked less by the goodwill of powers, 
and more by the ignorance of states about the strategic value of the 
technology in question.  Yet, once that value was realized, they 
quickly worked to undermine international legal measures meant 
to protect and promote the technology to their own strategic 
advantage.  This can certainly be said of the international telegraph 
system – Britain did not fully appreciate its value until the very late 
19th Century, arguably not until after the Spanish-American and 
Boer Wars.146  Likewise, Americans in the Post-War period 
believed that broadcasting Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe to Soviet states had strategic value, while the Soviets 
obviously believed radio-jamming benefitted them.147 
Certainly, some neo-realist theorists of international relations 
would posit that any goodwill or consensus was merely a myth, 
and that a better representation would simply be (1) the 
                                                     
145  See supra notes 97–104, 129–35 and accompanying text. 
146  See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
147  See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text; Warlaumont, supra note 
125, at 46–47 (“The radio war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was intense 
during times of crisis and appeared to ebb during times of détente.  It was 
characterized by a pattern of U.S. broadcasting and Soviet jamming.  In addition, 
both nations broadcast in many languages around the world competing for 
supporters in the cold-war ideological debate . . . .  Preventing or jamming 
incoming broadcasts is important to nations attempting to maintain strict control 
and who use the media primarily to support party goals.  Both Cuba and the 
U.S.S.R. operate under systems that advocate the control of information.  In the 
radio war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, jamming has often proved to be 
an effective strategy because Soviet listeners do not have easy access to 
information from other sources . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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introduction of a new technology and (2) a competition among 
states internationally to use the technology to their strategic or 
commercial advantage.148  While there is some evidence of this 
among the three case studies, I also do not think this is an accurate 
understanding of the regulatory “patterns” or cycles examined.  
The reality is that there was a period of consensus about the 
telegraph that led to an impressive and wholly progressive – for 
the period – international legal regime, as represented by the 1875 
International Telegraph Convention.  Similarly, there was a period 
in the Post War Period where radio jamming was almost non-
existent and, with the introduction of satellite communications 
technology, a positive vision shared by the international 
community led to the strikingly positive 1967 Treaty on Outer 
Space.149  A strictly neo-realist view of these case studies cannot 
account for these realities.  Then again, certainly it was use and 
abuse of communications technologies that often led to greater 
telecommunications control and disruption or, on the other hand, a 
push to innovation so as to avoid such challenges. 
Moreover, another central theme relating to the brief moments 
of consensus and goodwill is that the international legal rules, 
regulations, policies, or institutions adopted during the brief 
periods of consensus, and employed with a more cooperative aim, 
led, not surprisingly, to more robust and effective international 
legal measures for protecting global communications from 
censorship, surveillance, disruption, and control.  The Submarine 
Cable Convention and the International Telegraph Convention (at 
least its 1875 version) were strong, even visionary, international 
legal schemes with noticeable weaknesses – a failure to address 
times of war.150  Similarly, the many international legal instruments 
and documents forged in the Post War Period that reflected and 
promoted the “free flow of information” are among the most 
                                                     
148  See Nye, supra note 1 (offering some rebuttal to strictly neo-realist 
contentions in the Internet space in the context of “cyberpower”).  
149  See supra notes 97–104, 129–30 and accompanying text. 
150  Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 
1884, 163 C.T.S. 241 (entered into force May 1, 1888); see also supra notes 87–88 and 
accompanying text.  The Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph 
Cables, like the 1875 Telegraph Convention, was innovative in that it took 
individuals as its focus or subject matter, a rarity in international law in the 
period.  On this point, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.  See also Kelsen, 
supra note 62, at 537–38 (noting that the Convention directly obligated 
individuals).  
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important international legal tools from which are found not only 
communication rights, but also universal human rights more 
generally.  Finally, the Treaty on Outer Space of 1967 declared and 
protected space from war and hostilities for the ensuing decades;151 
space remains just as peaceful today. 
So, while healthy skepticism about a perfectly congruous 
“Cycle” is warranted, the historical parallels are at least worth 
considering, both from an historical perspective but also from the 
perspective of present legal and policy challenges concerning the 
Internet. 
 
4.1. Has the Internet Had Its “Boer War” Moment? 
 
This leads us back to Wu’s question about the Internet.  One 
possibility, in light of these case studies, is that the Internet may 
have already experienced its “Boer War” moment.  What does this 
mean?  The Boer War, ending in 1900, was an important and 
consequential turning point in the fate and future direction of the 
international telegraph system, at least in terms of its regulation 
and control by states.  Britain’s overreaching and questionable use 
of Article 8 powers for broad cable censorship, surveillance, and 
control sent shockwaves among the other world powers about the 
clear strategic asset the telegraph had become in Britain’s hands. 152 
Up until that point, the world community seemed to view the 
telegraph as a tool for global prosperity and commercial growth, 
with most states happy to let Britain take the lead in its expansion 
and governance through private enterprise.153 
However, from the Boer War onward, it was understood as a 
strategic asset and a potentially powerful instrument of war.  States 
would compete and move to strengthen their own position in the 
international telegraph system through investment in 
infrastructure both to break Britain’s hold and to re-shape the 
international regulatory regime governing the International 
Telegraph System to their advantage.  States would work to “free 
themselves from dependence on foreign cables” and state 
cryptanalysis capabilities, not only to protect the secrecy of their 
                                                     
151  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
152  See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
153  See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
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own messages, but also to break the codes of other competing 
states.154  The international telegraph system would never be the 
same after the revelations of the Boer War; any goodwill or 
consensus disintegrated into competition and control.  
Concerning the Internet, we have likely already left any period 
of consensus concerning Internet regulation and governance.  
Certainly, states have censored and monitored the Internet for 
years,155 which is clear evidence that many countries have long 
understood the Internet’s potential as either an offensive 
technology or as a threat to national security, stability, or some 
other national interest.  Arguably, however, we have entered an 
even more acute stage of information conflict and control.  First, as 
noted at the outset, states have been ramping up “cyberwar” 
capabilities in recent years, such as the U.S. National Cybersecurity 
Center established in June 2009.156  Other countries have followed 
suit, creating the semblance of an international race to develop 
information security capabilities, both offensively and defensively.  
Second, until now, there had not been so many sustained and 
coordinated international efforts to deploy international 
institutions, law, or regulations to control or regulate the 
telecommunications technology.157  That may be the backstory to 
the ITU’s 2012 controversial World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT-12) this past December.158  The 
                                                     
154  HEADRICK, supra note 20, at 219–24. 
155  The ONI has been tracking Internet censorship since 2003.  Oni Team, 
Global Internet Filtering in 2012 at a Glance, OPENNET INITIATIVE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://opennet.net/blog/2012/04/global-internet-filtering-2012-glance. 
156 Hull et al., supra note 1, at 41–32; see generally Geers, supra note 1.   
157  This is likely due to the increasing use of cyber-weapons and cyber-
warfare by Governments, and the growing role for international bodies like the 
UN and ITU in Internet governance.  States like China, Russia, and other Internet 
censors see such international forums as helpful mechanisms to “legitimize” their 
vision for a controlled Internet.  RON J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE 
FOR CYBERSPACE 173–74 (2013). 
158  See Richi Jennings, Victory!  UN/ITU Powergrab Thwarted at WCIT, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 14, 2012, 6:20 AM), 
http://blogs.computerworld.com/internet/21500/victory-unitu-internet-power-
grab-thwarted-wcit-itbwcw (describing the WCIT treaty as controversial and 
noting that a number of countries refused to sign it); Jeremy Fleming, UN Chief 
Warns ‘New Cold War’ Looms over the Internet, EURACTIVE.COM (Feb. 28 2013, 8:13 
AM), http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-mobile-broadband/un-chief-
warns-new-cold-war-blow-news-518118 (“[T]he EU joined the United States and 
Canada in refusing to sign up to the treaty changes, creating a divide with the rest 
of the world.”). 
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meeting, its looming threat of an Internet “takeover,” either 
through regulation or transferring ICANN’s Internet governance 
responsibilities to the ITU, and its deeply divided conclusion (a 
vote split nearly down the middle) suggest any consensus about 
Internet governance and regulation is behind us.159 
While each of these developments is important, if there was 
any moment for the Internet comparable to the revelations of the 
Boer War and the telegraph, it was the National Security Agency 
revelations of 2013.  The NSA’s large scale Internet and 
telecommunications surveillance – through programs like PRISM, 
decryption methods, and other means160 – and international 
reactions thereto,161 likely mean global efforts to censor, control, or 
monitor the Internet will only grow in both intensity and scope. 
 
5. BREAKING THE REGULATORY PATTERNS? 
5.1. Censorship & Surveillance Resistance:                               
International Legal Foundations 
 
Things may not be all dark.  No pattern or cycle is inevitable 
and arguably, with each new technology, efforts to understand and 
resist regulation and control by states will have both historical 
precedent and existing infrastructure, including international legal 
rules, from which to learn.  As already argued, for example, these 
leftover and remaining international legal rules and institutions 
adopted during the brief periods of consensus cooperation, may 
                                                     
159 Id. 
160 See sources cited supra note 1, with respect to “increasing” surveillance 
capabilities.  See infra note 161 for sources concerning PRISM. 
161 See Didier Bigo, Gertjan Boulet, Caspar Bowden, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth 
Guild, Nicholas Hernanz, Paul de Hert, Julien Jeandesboz & Amandine Scherrer, 
Open Season for Data Fishing on the Web: The Challenges of the US Prism Programme 
for the EU, CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 293 (June 18, 2013) (“The revelation of the top-
secret US intelligence-led PRISM programme has triggered wide-ranging debates 
across Europe”); Jedidiah Bracy, The NSA’s PRISM Program and Reactions, THE 
PRIVACY ADVISOR, THE INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’L (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/the_nsas_prism_program_an
d_reactions (observing that the “revelations about Verizon and the NSA[] is 
affecting talks between the EU and U.S. on a data protection agreement”) (citation 
omitted); Editorial, Worldwide Reaction to NSA/PRISM Surveillance—An Overview, 
INFOSECURITY MAG. (June 12, 2013), http://www.infosecurity-
magazine.com/view/32901/worldwide-reaction-to-nsaprism-surveillance-an-
overview/. 
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lead to more robust and effective protections for global 
telecommunications.  Indeed, these case studies also have 
important legal and policy lessons for those aiming to implement 
new state mass surveillance practices, and for those aiming to resist 
such practices. 
With the U.S. Government announcing cyber-deterrence 
measures, and countries like China and Iran ramping up both 
cyber-security and Internet censorship capabilities in response, 
geo-politics once again permeate and complicate global 
communications policy, much as they did for telegraph, radio, and 
satellite communications.  Within this broader geo-political 
context, critics have questioned the legitimacy of “Internet 
freedom” and related activities like Internet censorship or 
surveillance resistance.162  These criticisms often have both a legal 
and political component, questioning how state or non-state actors 
can justify censorship circumvention tools that supposedly 
undermine national laws that implement local security or cultural 
policy preferences (and are presumably enforced by Internet 
filtering or censorship regimes). 
 
5.1.1. A Reasonable Legal Foundation 
 
Notwithstanding uncertainty as to the legality of different 
forms of communications, censorship under international law, a 
reasonable and legitimate legal basis for Internet censorship or 
surveillance circumvention, and related activities, can be easily 
articulated.  Internet censorship or surveillance resistance activities 
help promote important and recognized international legal rights 
and principles, like freedom of information, freedom of expression, 
and the right to “seek, receive and impart information . . . .”163  All 
of these values have been recognized under international law in a 
broad range of treaties, conventions, international legal precedents, 
and declarations, many of which were discussed above, such as the 
UN Declaration on Freedom of Information,164 Article 19 of the 
UN’s 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,165 
                                                     
162  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
163  UDHR, supra note 100, art. 19. 
164  Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 101. 
165  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1666, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.  
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and the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
latter of which is today largely understood to represent customary 
international law, rendering it binding on all states.166 
Moreover, the panoply of international telecommunication 
conventions, regulations, and resolutions has condemned 
communication disruption and censorship – across a variety of 
technologies like those herein discussed – throughout the twentieth 
century.  Internet censorship resistance activities, engaged by both 
state and non-state actors, is also consistent with the principles of 
the free flow of information doctrine – a policy that had near 
unanimous international support in the post war years.167  
Although this consensus weakened over time, the free flow 
doctrine still retains influence and wide international support.168  
While international disputes over the legality of global 
communications disruption and censorship left many questions 
unanswered, those efforts led to the important recognition and 
codification of international legal principles that provide a 
reasonable legal foundation for Internet censorship resistance 
today. 
 
5.2. National Security Justifications and Their Limits 
 
Critics would no doubt counter, as earlier discussed, that 
Internet censorship or surveillance circumvention – both state and 
non-state efforts like BBC World Service’s effort to deliver online 
content to heavily censored regions169 – undermines national laws 
                                                     
166  UDHR, supra note 100, art. 19. 
167  See supra notes 97–110 and accompanying text. 
168  Penney, supra note 94, at 25, 29–31 (noting that the “Free Flow of 
Information Paradigm, largely advocated by the United States and other Western 
countries, remained influential at the international level for decades after the Post-
War years“; later demonstrating how each element of the “free flow of 
information doctrine” can be found reflected in a recent report on internet access 
rights by Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression). 
169  KARL KATHURIA ET AL., CANADA CTR. FOR GLOBAL SEC. STUD. & CITIZEN LAB, 
UNIV. OF TORONTO, CASTING A WIDER NET: LESSONS LEARNED IN DELIVERING BBC 
CONTENT ON THE CENSORED INTERNET (2011), available at 
http://www.munkschool.utoronto.ca/downloads/casting.pdf (noting that “The 
restrictive communications environment and legal and regulatory frameworks in 
China and Iran, coupled with the regimes’ tendency to adapt information controls 
to sensitive events, makes them challenging markets for delivering news content 
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reflecting local culture, morality, and security, which are enforced 
by Internet filtering and censorship.  Justifications based on public 
morality or security arise from the principle of state sovereignty – a 
bedrock of international law.  While state sovereignty is a 
fundamental international legal principle, our case studies also 
offer insight as to how far the principle can be stretched to justify 
censorship or surveillance.  To begin with, policing local morality 
is often cited as a basis for Internet censorship or filtering – and 
modern international legal documents often include as a potential 
limit on free expression – but it was historically limited in scope.170  
In the 1875 Telegraph Convention, no private telegram could be 
blocked or prevented from reaching its destination for reasons of 
morality, decency, or even public order without also notifying the 
sender.171  In practice, after the 1903 revisions, states like Britain 
dubiously utilized Article 8 stoppage and its notice exception to 
circumvent Article 7 – yet the mandatory notice requirements 
remain.172  With the rise of satellite and radio communications, the 
most common “state sovereignty” theories supposedly justifying 
jamming activities were not based on public morality, but control 
over airspace or national security, with the latter being the most 
robust.  National security has long been the most compelling 
justification for telecommunication censorship and surveillance 
regimes.173 
However, the national security justification has also 
experienced historical limits.  For example, before the Telegraph 
Convention’s Service Regulations were revised in 1903, no private 
or state telegram could be blocked for national security reasons 
without also immediately notifying its sender,174 which frustrated 
                                                     
and suitable test beds for assessing strategies for bypassing censorship to ensure 
news delivery.”).  Id. at 24. 
170  See supra notes 97–110 and accompanying text. 
171  See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
172  Admittedly, states move to regulate the use of secret codes during war, as 
even with decryption capabilities, surveillance was difficult and time consuming.  
See CHARLES M. DOLLAR & JOAN R. GUNDERSON, AMERICA, CHANGING TIMES 853 (2d 
ed. 1982) (stating that “[m]uch of this work of deciphering messages (1914-1918) was 
laborious and time consuming, still based largely upon frequency analysis. . .”); DAVID 
PAULL NICKLES, UNDER THE WIRE: HOW THE TELEGRAPH CHANGED DIPLOMACY 181 
(1st ed. 2003) (discussing how U.S. State Department officials found it difficult to 
decode their own coded cables).  
173  See generally Hills, supra note 44, at 195 (arguing that the basis for 
censorship has almost always been perceived threats to national security). 
174  See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
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the purpose of secret cable surveillance and censorship.  Even 
under the 1903 London revisions, national security censorship was 
limited – only State telegrams (not private) could be legally 
“suspended” without notification, and only if such notice would 
pose a “dangerous” threat to national security (e.g., when the 
sending State and blocking State were at war).175  During 
international debates about DBS communications, scholars 
questioned whether theories of national security based on 
customary international legal principles could justify satellite 
jamming.176  This conversation led to international efforts to 
negotiate a new treaty to cover satellite communications and its 
regulation.  In other words, these case studies suggest that the 
most cited justifications for Internet censorship may not have been 
as broad as commonly described or understood today. 
 
5.3. Alien Torts, Internet Intermediaries, and Expanding 
International Legal Liabilities and Risks 
 
An additional historical insight from these case studies is the 
potential for national or international litigation over transnational 
telecommunications disputes.  In the past, state and non-state 
actors sought redress over communication related disputes or 
injuries through other means such as litigation when there was 
insufficient or uncertain international enforcement or protection.177  
Occasionally, as with British companies seeking redress for 
telegraph cable cutting, this involved national or international 
litigation.178  But with radio jamming, states began to file formal 
complaints or claims with national or international bodies or 
                                                     
175  The 1903 regulation changes allowed for Article 8 “suspension” of the 
telegram service (for the service as a whole, or for certain classes of 
correspondence) without notice to the sender if providing notice posed a danger 
to national security.  However, notice requirements for Article 7 stoppages of 
private telegrams remained in place.  See supra notes 43–54, 77–86 and 
accompanying text. 
176  See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
177  For example, see the discussion of the 1923 Case of the Cuba Submarine 
Telegraph Company, wherein British companies sought redress through litigation 
against the United States for cutting British submarine cables during the Spanish 
American war.  See supra notes 87–88, 123–28 and accompanying text. 
178  See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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tribunals.179 
Avoiding potential entanglement in international disputes and 
related litigation between states may be one good reason for 
organizations involved with Internet censorship resistance to shun 
official state sponsorship.  As with the radio jamming, officially 
sponsored U.S. radio broadcasts were specifically targeted by 
foreign jammers, and were the subject of complaints lodged in 
international forums.180  Of course, shunning state sponsorship 
may also leave an organization vulnerable to legal complaints from 
foreign governments.  For example, the FCC shut down non-
licensed pirate radio stations in Miami in response to complaints 
from the Cuban Government.181 
The current potential for litigation over state censorship and 
surveillance online – and related issues like surveillance 
technology, censorship circumvention, and human rights – is even 
more acute with recent trends in both international law and U.S. 
federal law. Indeed, international law has evolved in recent 
decades through new legal rights, added responsibilities, and 
potential liabilities for non-state actors like corporations and 
organizations.182  These changes, combined with other evolutions 
in domestic U.S. law – such as the growth of legal claims for 
violations of international law brought under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) – has created a new minefield of potential liabilities for U.S. 
Internet intermediaries and technology companies, as well as 
organizations engaged in transnational Internet related activities 
abroad.183 
ATS – a simple statute passed in 1789184 – was likely meant to 
afford foreign plaintiffs, such as merchants and ambassadors, the 
right to sue American citizens in U.S. courts for violations of 
international law and for causing injury to person or property.185  
                                                     
179  See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
180  See supra notes 103–04, 123–28, 147 and accompanying text. 
181  See supra notes 125 and accompanying text. 
182  Censorship and surveillance resistance are closely related because 
Internet surveillance and monitoring likely causes users to censor their speech or 
other activities online.  See Roger P. Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint 
Tortfeasors for International Law Violations, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 223, 223–24 (2011) 
(discussing changes in modern international law). 
183  Id. at 235; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) [hereinafter ATS].  
184  ATS, supra note 183.  The ATS was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 
73, § 9 (1789).  
185  Gary C. Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of 
the Alien Torts Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 246 (2004). 
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Today, ATS allows for a broader range of international claims.  
With increasing numbers of successful plaintiffs obtaining 
judgments and settlements, ATS awards range from $1.5 million to 
$766 million in compensatory damages, and have been as high as 
$1.2 billion in punitive damages.186  A central concern here is that 
U.S. companies and organizations may eventually be found liable 
under ATS for aiding and abetting human rights abuses, or other 
breaches of international law committed or condoned by foreign 
governments.187  While these issues are far from settled, at least one 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested “reckless disregard” is 
sufficient intent for liability under such ATS claims.188  More 
recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has moved to 
limit the extraterritorial usage of ATS in cases like Kiobel; yet much 
of its scope, including application to human rights and related 
legal issues concerning online transnational activities, remains 
unresolved.189 
Given the increasingly complex and central role intermediaries 
play in state surveillance and censorship – such as online service 
providers and gatekeepers – it is not difficult to imagine a U.S. 
company being sued for directly or indirectly assisting 
authoritarian regimes conducting online censorship, surveillance, 
or tracking that has led to human rights abuses.  In fact, there are 
instances where this has already happened.  Yahoo Inc., for 
example, famously settled an ATS legal action brought against it 
for intentionally or negligently assisting Chinese authorities in 
tracking down Chinese human rights activists and dissidents.190  
More recently, Cisco Systems was sued by a group of Chinese 
nationals and residents, including online dissident and writer 
Daobin Du, for supplying technology to the Chinese Government 
for use in its “Golden Shield” program for online censorship and 
                                                     
186  Alford, supra note 182, at 235–36. 
187  Id. at 235. 
188  Neil Conley, Comment, The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade: 
Yahoo’s Collaboration with the Chinese Government in Jailing a Chinese Journalist and 
Yahoo’s Possible Liability Under the Alien Torts Claim Act, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 171, 
205 (2006). 
189  See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of 
Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329 (2013) (explaining how the 
scope of the ATS remains unclear following Kiobel). 
190  Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST (Nov. 
14, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/13/AR2007111300885.html?hpid=topnews. 
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tracking.191  Although the case was dismissed by a District Court in 
Maryland on preliminary legal and jurisdictional matters, its ruling 
on ATS has been strongly criticized.192 
But what about organizations and individuals involved in 
censorship resistance activities?  Do they have anything to worry 
about concerning these expanding legal liabilities?  Internet 
censorship resistance activities are fraught with complicated 
international legal issues – including human rights – that create 
serious risks and dangers.  Again, it is not difficult to envision a 
person suffering serious harms for being caught using a censorship 
resistant system or tool, when dealing with censorship regimes and 
security apparatus in countries like China or Iran.  But if a legal 
claim was ever brought against an organization involved in 
developing or distributing censorship resistant tools, it would 
probably look like the infamous Haystack controversy – wherein 
developers greatly exaggerated the capabilities of a program 
allegedly designed to allow citizens in countries like Iran and 
China to safely circumvent Internet censorship and surveillance.193  
In such instances, it would not be a stretch to claim Haystack 
developers exhibited “reckless disregard”194 and indirectly aided 
state authorities if an Iranian citizen was arrested or otherwise 
harmed for using the flawed Haystack tool. 
Of course, there are other complex issues in such cases, and 
ATS case law continues to evolve and, as noted, is largely 
unresolved.  At the very least, they complicate the regulatory 
                                                     
191  Cindy Cohn & Rainey Reitman, Maryland Court Dismisses Landmark Case 
that Sought to Hold Cisco Responsible for Violating Human Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014), available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/maryland-court-dismisses-landmark-
case-sought-hold-cisco-responsible-violating; Rob Lever, Cisco Cleared in Rights 
Case, as Tech Sector Watches, DIGITAL J. (Nov. 13, 2007), 
http://digitaljournal.com/biz/business/cisco-cleared-in-rights-case-as-tech-
sector-watches/article/373736. 
192  Cohn & Reitman, supra note 191. 
193  Evgeny Morozov, More on Internet Intellectuals and the Haystack Affair, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/14/more_on_internet_intellec
tuals_and_the_haystack_affair. 
194  The “reckless disregard” standard for Alien Torts principles was 
endorsed by Justice Reinhardt in his concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s 
Unocal II decision: John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 954–56 (9th Cir. 2002), 
vacated, reh 'g en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).  See Conley, supra note 188, at 
205–06 (considering the “reckless disregard” standard, and applying it to the 
Yahoo / Shi Tao case).  
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online space and cannot be ignored by either state or non-state 
actors – for better or for worse. 
 
5.4. Network Neutrality, Encryption Rights, and the Economics of 
Privacy 
 
Mass Internet surveillance remains a critical and growing 
threat to privacy and security.  State signaled intelligence and 
electronic spying agencies are heavily investing in building mass 
surveillance capacity, including surveillance technologies and code 
breaking.195  The significance of some recent revelations that the 
N.S.A. may have the ability to circumvent most encrypted 
messages196 and are building “quantum” computers to break most 
cryptographic methods197 has led to an important debate about 
privacy and the usefulness of popular encryption standards and 
methods.198  On one side are experts like Adir Shamir, considered 
to be the “godfather” of encryption, who believes that we are in a 
“post-crypto world” and need to rethink security and privacy 
measures.199  On the other side are experts such as Bruce Schneier 
who acknowledge powerful state capabilities and the shortcomings 
of encryption methods, but who still believes it is essential for 
ensuring security and privacy.200  At a minimum, there may be 
                                                     
195  See Ball, supra note 1.  
196  See Perlroth et al., supra note 1; Rich & Gellman, supra note 1. 
197  Rich & Gellman, supra note 1. 
198  See Andy Green, Cryptography May Not Be Dead, but It Is on Life Support, 
VARONIS BLOG (Jan. 21, 2014), http://blog.varonis.com/cryptography-may-dead-
life-support/ (“Over the last year, cryptography and data security have been 
completely shaken by malware, and specifically advanced persistent threats or 
APTs, leading some to say or at least imply that cryptography is dead.”).  
199  John Leyden, Prepare for ‘Post-Crypto World’, Warns Godfather of Encryption, 
THE REGISTER (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:37 PM); see Kim Nursall, Cicada 3301, Cryptography 
and the Quest for Anonymity, TORONTO STAR (Jan. 3, 2014, 10:21 AM), 
http://www.thestar.com/entertainment/2014/01/03/cicada_3301_cryptography
_and_the_quest_for_anonymity.html (quoting “a 25-year-old computer science 
student from Alberta . . . under the username Noxpopuli . . . [as saying,] ”‘You see 
a lot of the big names in (the field) talking about how cryptography is dead . . .’”).  
200  See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-
surveillance; Bruce Schneier, The NSA is Breaking Most Encryption on the Internet, 
SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:46 PM), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html.   
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some insightful information gained from our case studies and 
telegraph discussions, and interesting legal or policy 
developments. 
To begin with, courts tackling new cyber-security and related 
measures can return to the Telegraph Convention for guidance.  
Fifteen years after Bernstein v. U.S. Justice Department201 forced the 
U.S. Government to scale back its export regulations on encryption 
technologies, similar privacy technology regulations may soon 
return under the guise of federal controls on “cyber-weapons” or 
cyber tools that could be used for “criminal, terrorist, or military 
activities.”202  Certainly, anonymizing tools that use encryption 
could fall into the National Defense Authorization Act’s broad 
definition.  If so, a broader constitutional right to use privacy or 
secrecy enhancing technologies may be required, or at least one 
that elaborates the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Bernstein further.  On 
this count, the 1875 Telegraph Convention’s innovative and 
express right to use secret language and code in 
telecommunications – as well as a policy preventing states from 
interfering with such transmissions – offers some historical, 
conceptual, and international legal precedential basis for such a 
right or interest. 
Moreover, telegraph surveillance also provides some guidance 
on the “economics” of privacy and security today.  Pervasive 
online surveillance capabilities demonstrated by state agencies like 
the N.S.A. have arguably now rendered Internet communications 
very much akin to telegraph communications in the late 1800s.  At 
that time, Britain and a handful of other world powers owned 
                                                     
201  Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 192 
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that regulations preventing mathematician from 
distributing encryption software violated the First Amendment).   
202  See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-66, § 940(a)–(c), 127 Stat. 672, 837 (2013) (regulating the proliferation of 
cyber weapons and providing mechanisms for the military to develop cyber 
attack capabilities); US Defense Budget to Both Regulate and Proliferate Cyber 
Weapons, TRIPWIRE: THE STATE OF SEC. (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/top-security-stories/us-defense-
budget-regulate-proliferate-cyber-weapons/ (commenting on the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014); James Gorelick et al., United 
States: Support Continues to Build for New Export Controls on Cyber Monitoring 
Technologies, MONDAQ (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/281262/Export+controls+Trade+Inve
stment+Sanctions/Support+Continues+to+Build+for+New+Export+Controls+on
+Cyber+Monitoring+Technologies  (outlining the sources of support for export 
controls for Internet Protocol network surveillance systems and equipment).  
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much of the telegraph system.  Through that infrastructure, they 
conducted telegraph surveillance.  Those sending an international 
telegram in plain language knew the message would pass by 
countless sets of eyes and hands at various cable stations around 
the world, wherein telegraph operators worked and re-routed 
cables.  Those operators, working as “censors” for the British or 
other state governments, could easily intercept or steal important 
communications along the way.203  That reality led, as noted, to 
widespread use of secret languages, codes, and other forms of 
“encryption” methods, both by companies and states to ensure 
secrecy in telegram communications.  Of course, very much like 
today, for states heavily invested in cryptography and surveillance 
infrastructure, particularly Britain during World War I, mass 
surveillance still remained very costly and difficult – particularly 
code-breaking.204  Even when governments prohibited encrypted 
communications during war, surveillance remained difficult due to 
the complex challenge of dealing with a “mass of telegraph 
messages.”205  The economics of telegraph surveillance meant it 
was never targeted “en mass” but focused on “specific targets.”206 
These historical insights encapsulate Schneier’s argument 
about the use of encryption today.  While the N.S.A. and state 
signal intelligence agencies have enormous capabilities, “they are 
not magical” and the best defense is “to make surveillance of us as 
expensive as possible.”207  This is the economics of privacy and 
mass surveillance.  If a user is a target of the N.S.A., there are very 
few ways to avoid compromise in the face of an advanced 
persistent threat.  However, just as the economics of privacy for the 
telegraph meant that use of codes and ciphers could often ensure 
an important measure of privacy, so too, for the vast majority of 
                                                     
203  Hills, supra note 44, at 198 (describing how the British government 
adopted procedures to control transnational communications in the event of war).  
204 DOLLAR & GUNDERSON, supra note 61, at 853 (“Much of this work of 
deciphering messages (1914–1918) was laborious and time consuming, still based largely 
upon frequency analysis.”); NICKLES, supra note 61, at 181 (discussing a story 
whereby U.S. State Department officials found it time consuming and difficult to 
decode their own coded cables).   
205  Hills, supra note 44, at 197, 201 (noting that effective censorship likely 
required discrimination that targeted messages that were specifically likely to 
yield beneficial information).  
206  Id. 
207  Schneier, NSA Surveillance, supra note 200 (detailing the limitations of the 
NSA’s surveillance program and suggesting that basic encryption methods can 
frustrate monitoring attempts).   
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Internet users, incorporating basic security measures and 
encryption use can ensure privacy and security even today.  The 
more expensive mass surveillance is, the safer we are.  Indeed, 
recent research suggests that the cheapening cost of mass 
surveillance, compared to earlier times, may be the greatest threat 
to privacy and liberty concerns.208 
This raises another important question – the importance of 
legally promoting network neutrality to protect privacy and 
security.  One of the more contentious and important regulatory 
debates concerning the Internet today is focused on “network 
neutrality” – put simply:  whether Internet and telecommunication 
providers should be legally obliged to treat all Internet traffic and 
data the same.  Thus, under a net neutral regime there can be no 
“broadband discrimination” or other actions to treat some traffic 
different from others.209  Though usually related to broader 
regulatory and communication policy, our case study in telegraph 
surveillance provides insights into its importance for what I have 
been referring to as the “economics of privacy.”  An important 
legal measure that helped ensure privacy through telegram 
communications was the 1875 Telegraph Convention’s 
requirement that states allow any “encrypted” telegraph 
transmissions through their territory (and if they did not, they had 
to notify the state of origins).210  This rudimentary telegraph 
communication network neutrality requirement, in normal times, 
rendered surveillance or censorship of encrypted telegrams much 
more impractical, raising costs and the legal stakes.  Today, with 
                                                     
208  Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of 
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of U.S. v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. 335 (2014) (reviewing 
the economic cost of implementing various forms of surveillance and identifying 
methods that make long term monitoring relatively cheap); see generally Ian 
Brown, The Economics of Privacy, Data Protection and Surveillance, in HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET (M. Latzer & J. M. Bauer eds., 2015) (“Law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies are intensive users of surveillance 
technologies and data gathered by third parties, especially as the technologies to 
perform such surveillance become ever cheaper”) (citation omitted). 
209  See generally Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: 
Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007) (debating 
whether deviations from network neutrality would necessarily harm consumers 
and innovation); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
210  International Telegraph Convention, supra note 39, art. VI, VIII.  I use 
“encrypted” here in quotations to note that many of the secret codes and 
languages used would not, by modern standards, constitute a proper 
cryptographic method.   
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reports of ISPs throttling, blocking, or discriminating against 
encrypted Internet traffic211 – in clear violation of network 
neutrality principles – the push to preserve such neutrality 
becomes that much more important to the economics of 
surveillance and our privacy rights.  Again, the more costly the 
surveillance is for the watchers, the safer regular users will be from 
mass forms of surveillance. 
5.5. Other Cooperative and Effective Measures:  Legal, Institutional, 
Political 
5.5.1. Alternative Regulatory Role for International Institutions 
 
As noted, one of the themes argued here based on the case 
studies is that global telecommunications were better protected 
from state censorship, disruption, and control by more cooperative 
endeavors among the many states.  The case studies offer some 
concrete ideas for similar cooperative approaches today that might 
either forge a different path from pure information conflict and 
control, or, at the very least, attenuate its impact on the Internet 
and its reach. 
First, that in the years ahead, information conflicts concerning 
the Internet will be fought in “cyberspace” – likely through 
“cyberwarfare” – but also through international institutions.  The 
Cold War information conflicts were played out not only in 
battlefields and proxy wars, but also within and between 
international institutions.  We may be seeing this already in 
relation to the Internet from recent controversies focused on the 
ITU.  In light of this, those concerned with the fate of Internet 
freedom such as states, organizations, and individuals, would do 
well to not withdraw from these organizations, but to continue to 
advocate for the free flow of information. 
Second, a purely negative vision for international law and 
institutions will not do.  Much of the discourse offered by Internet 
                                                     
211  April Glaser, Net Neutrality Isn’t Totally Lost: Here’s How the FCC Can Test 
for ISP Bad Behavior, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01/31/net_neutrality_isn_t_tot
ally_lost_the_fcc_can_test_for_isp_bad_behavior.html (“In recent years we’ve 
seen dozens of Internet providers in the United States and around the world act in 
non-neutral ways.  In 2007, for example, Comcast was caught interfering with its 
customers’ use of Bit Torrent and other peer-to-peer file sharing.  We witnessed a 
major Canadian ISP slow down all encrypted file transfers . . .”). 
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activists in opposition to the ITU and the WCIT potential 
“takeover” of the Internet was simply that the ITU should keep its 
hands off and go away.  But the ITU is unlikely to go anywhere.  
Moreover, if we are to believe the recent Congressional testimony 
of Federal Communications Commissioner Robert McDowell, the 
ITU has committed to reinventing itself in relation to the Internet, 
just as it had for technologies before it, such as the telegraph, 
telephone, radio, and communications satellite.212  Withdrawing 
from international institutions, or failing to offer a role for them to 
play, leaves those same institutions and their future direction open 
to states like China, Russia, or Iran, whose aim to control and 
censor the Internet are clear. 
So, what might a positive role look like?  The ITU’s Cold War 
radio jamming monitor offers one possible vision.  In some ways, 
the radio jamming monitoring program, implemented in the 1980s, 
was an earlier version of more contemporary efforts to map and 
track Internet censorship around the world that is carried out by 
non-governmental organizations such as the OpenNet Initiative 
and Herdict.  The success of the IFRB – even if the program was 
short lived – provides additional insights into its program’s great 
value and potential influence.  Of course, the difference between 
such non-governmental efforts and an ITU-led Internet censorship 
monitor is that the latter would, like its earlier radio incarnation, 
have a much deeper pool of resources to draw on for technical 
implementation and would also have the UN’s institutional reach 
for large scale coordination and exposure, adding even greater 
reputational costs to the dark art of Internet censorship. 
 
5.5.2. Influencing the “Middle” 
 
Such an Internet censorship-monitoring program would be 
                                                     
212  Fighting for Internet Freedom: Dubai and Beyond, Joint Subcommittee Hearing 
Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 
Organizations (2013) (statement of Robert M. McDowell, Commissioner, Federal 
Communications Commission), available at 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20130205/100221/HHRG-113-IF16-
Wstate-McDowellR-20130205.pdf (outlining newly acquired policing powers of 
the ITU over the internet). 
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beneficial, not just in providing greater knowledge and insight 
about global censorship trends, but also in influencing the 
“middle.”  That is, rather than focusing on high profile (and 
commonly cited) countries like China and Iran that are committed 
to broad and sophisticated Internet censorship, the program would 
focus instead on the broader middle – the range of countries that 
engage in some level of Internet filtering or censorship but that 
may be more responsive to bad press or international exposure 
because they are more concerned about their reputation and the 
economic costs of censorship.  During the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union was unrelenting both in its resolve and technical capacity to 
jam Western radio broadcasts and no amount of international 
exposure or condemnation deterred it from that path.  But, as 
noted in our study, less wealthy countries were more easily 
swayed by international exposure through ITU monitoring.  This 
was likely due to a range of factors such as the costs involved in 
radio jamming, sensitivity to international reputation, or simply 
wishing to avoid stepping into the middle of an ongoing dispute 
between superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. 
 
5.5.3. Avoiding Cold War Analogies 
 
Finally, it should be said that among certain legal and public 
policy circles, and certainly within the national security 
establishment, there is a growing trend to describe and address the 
challenges of Internet cyber-security matters through the lens of 
the Cold War.  While there are certainly descriptive and analytical 
reasons for drawing on Cold War experiences to understand 
current developments like the “militarization” of cyberspace,213 
these case studies suggest that adopting Cold War analogies may 
do more harm than good to Internet censorship and surveillance 
resistance.  Historically, international legal protections for free and 
open global communications have been more robust in times of 
peace and weakest in times of war. 
This was the case with the Telegraph Conventions, which all 
provided relatively effective protection against telegram blocking 
                                                     
213  See generally Nye, supra note 1.  See also Ronald Deibert, Militarizing 
Cyberspace, MIT TECH. REV. (June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/25570/ (expounding upon the 
power dynamics of cyberspace).  
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and cable cutting among peaceful countries but proved inadequate 
in dealing with nations at war.  Similarly, global radio 
programming was never more free and unencumbered by 
censorship and other jamming activities than during the peaceful 
years after the Second World War, before the Cold War was in full 
swing.  State and national security officials eager to approach 
Internet and cyber-security issues with Cold War strategies have 
self-interested reasons for doing so – free and open Internet 
communications are easier to limit and control at war.  Both the 
history and current challenges concerning Internet censorship are 
complex; simple parallels to the Cold War, at the very least, gloss 
over those complexities. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this work is neither to establish that global 
telecommunication technologies follow a predetermined 
regulatory path nor to expound the precise state of international 
telecommunications law.  Rather, the point is to promote a more 
informed debate about current and historical regulatory challenges 
posed by telecommunications technology through the exploration 
of three case studies – involving influential and, in their time, 
predominant telecommunications technologies – and extrapolate 
theoretical, legal, or policy insights therefrom.  Part of that 
exploration has identified some interesting and noteworthy 
regulatory patterns.  For instance, the “cycles” of global 
telecommunication censorship and surveillance, and the insight 
that more cooperative approaches have led to more effective 
regulatory outcomes in protecting global telecommunications from 
disruption, censorship, or control.  However, to be clear, the 
analysis also suggests the “cycles” or patterns are neither 
obviously uniform nor congruent, inevitable, or universal; but they 
are useful and worthy of further study.  These insights, and others 
outlined here, hopefully provide some additional foundation and 
framework to tackle challenges posed by the evolving forms of 
Internet control, censorship, and surveillance today.  At the very 
least, analysts, lawyers, and policymakers would do well to not 
ignore these parallels.  The internet’s regulatory story is still 
unfolding, but at least these cases on global telecommunications 
technologies and their censorship, surveillance, and disruption 
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provide some basic ways to improve our chances to avoid or resist 
sustained information conflict, control, and, ultimately, paralysis.   
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